By Ivan Gharibyan

The bellicose statements frequently made by high-ranking Azerbaijani officials at the most crucial stage of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process suggest that a certain force is inspiring official Baku with its promises and advice. Considering the subtle geopolitical games in the South Caucasus, nothing can be stated with certainty, but some developments in the intensified Russian-Azerbaijani relations suggest a number of conclusions about joints efforts by Moscow and Baku aimed at thwarting the negotiations.

Taking a close view of the development of Russian-Azerbaijani contacts over the last five months (Head of the RF Presidential Administration Sergey Naryshkin has paid three visits to Baku over the recent months) one would easily notice that, after President Ilham Aliyev’s “courtesy visit” to Ulyanovsk, Azerbaijani Minister of Defense Safar Abiyev resumed talks about war as the only means of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Immediately afterwards, Azerbaijani parliamentarians began discussing the possibility of Azerbaijan’s joining the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The Parliament members of the ruling party Yeni Azerbaijan (New Azerbaijan) made plain statements that closer relations with Russia may ensure a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in favor of Azerbaijan.

All the steps are, on the one hand, suggestive of the desperate efforts by the Azerbaijani authorities, which are rushing from one geopolitical player to another. Considering Russia’s long-term position on the necessity for maintaining the status quo in the region, which position was recently revised, Russia and the West may have had serious disagreements over spheres of influence at the last moment. The matter can also concern the consolidation of the Russian forces objecting to excessively rapid “restart” of the Russian-U.S. relations. Or rather, Moscow may have understood too late that its “fervent” wish to “put a dirty trick” to Ukraine by signing oil and gas agreements with Turkey may cost her the influence over the South Caucasus.

As regards Georgia, there is nothing to speak about. Azerbaijan, in turn, has never been “famous” for its pro-Russian orientation. If reopened, the Armenian-Turkish border will seriously reduce the importance of Russian politico-military presence for Armenia. The Russian authorities may have arrived at a belated conclusion about the need for interfering in the processes going on in the South Caucasus. Since immediate interference in the Armenia-Turkey normalization process with “a minus sign” will thwart the resumption of contacts with the United States and affect Russia’s economic interests, particularly its trade and economic relations with Turkey, Baku remains the only means of torpedoing the normalization processes.

The Azerbaijani authorities, which are now facing the prospect of consenting to a referendum on Nagorno-Karabakh’s status under international pressure, are an “excellent present” for any of the Great Powers should they have a wish to torpedo the peace process in the region. In this context the Kremlin may have thought up an idea of inciting Ilham Aliyev and his team to new bellicose statements despite the OSCE Minsk Group’s appeals. Repeated threats of war may, one fine day, cause the Armenian authorities and people to change their moods with all the ensuring consequences…

On the other hand, we should remember RF President Dmitry Medvedev’s plain statement on the full agreement on the ways of settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Russia and the West. In the immediate future we will see difference between words and deeds.

Ivan Garibyan