The Past daily of Armenia writes as follows, in particular: One of the most important and most discussed concepts in recent years of Armenia’s political life has become the so-called “peace agenda,” which the current authorities present not only as a foreign policy strategy, but also as a key prerequisite for state existence, security, and development.

According to the authorities, the threat of a new war in the region continues to persist, and the biggest challenge for Armenia is to avoid another large-scale military conflict. That is why the “peace agenda” is presented as a vital necessity, as the boundary line on one side of which is peace and stability, and on the other side [is] war, with its grave human, territorial, economic, and psychological consequences. It is understandable that for a significant part of [Armenia’s] society, tired of wars, victims, losses and constant tension, such messages were perceptible, and public fears and concerns formed about security have become an important factor in the political struggle.

In fact, a significant part of the recent political discourse has been built on these fears and the idea of the need for peace. However, when assessing any peace agenda, the key question is not how much one of the parties wants peace, but whether the other party also wants to achieve peace. Let's not reinvent the wheel: peace cannot be a one-sided process.

If one party views peace as a system of compromises, stability and mutual respect, whereas the other as a means to achieve its own strategic goals, then talks about peace can turn into a process of legitimizing unequal power relations. This is where one of the most important questions for Armenia arises: is Azerbaijan truly moving forward with a peace agenda? Or is it talking about peace only as a political and diplomatic tool, simultaneously advancing completely different goals?

The developments of recent years show that there is a rather interesting contradiction between the political rhetoric and real actions of official Baku. On the one hand, the Azerbaijani leadership regularly announces on international platforms the need for a peace treaty [with Azerbaijan], speaks of the possibilities of new cooperation, the prospects for opening economic ties and developing communications in the region, but on the other hand, at the same time, [its] statements and political initiatives continue that are difficult to reconcile with the classical logic of peace.

The idea of peace usually implies that the parties renounce territorial claims to each other and try to form new rules of coexistence. However, in recent years, the fabricated, artificial idea of so-called "Western Azerbaijan," which has long since left the scope of public or academic discussions and turned into a component of the state agenda, is occupying an increasingly large place in Azerbaijani state policy.

This is where one of the biggest strategic dangers for Armenia lies. If in recent years the previous wording on the Artsakh [(Nagorno-Karabakh)] issue has gradually diminished in the Armenian political arena, if Armenia’s leadership actually declares that the priority is to ensure peace within the borders of the current Republic of Armenia, if even the issue of the return of Artsakh Armenians [to Artsakh] is often presented at the official level as an unrealistic goal, then the opposite process is taking place in the Azerbaijani political arena.

In Baku, conversations about territorial and historical claims are not decreasing, but on the contrary, they are becoming more institutionalized, receiving greater state support, and turning into long-term strategic plans. It is noteworthy that the term “Western Azerbaijan” is presented in Baku not as a “historical-academic” or “cultural” project, but as a political concept.

Within the framework of this concept, the territory of the Republic of Armenia is presented as the territory of historical residence of Azerbaijanis, and the current existence of Armenia is often described in such wording that actually questions the historical legitimacy of Armenian statehood. When such theories are voiced by individual politicians or experts, they can be considered as manifestations of political propaganda.

However, when they are presented at conferences being organized at the state level, in official documents, in the activities of state-funded organizations, the situation takes on a completely different meaning. This means that an ideological basis for future political demands [from Armenia] is being formed in Azerbaijan. Any territorial claim is first worded as a “historical” or humanitarian issue, then presented as a task of restoring rights, and later can turn into a political or diplomatic demand.

And that is why it is not only the existence of specific demands that is dangerous for Armenia, but also the ideological environment that is created around those demands. When one side constantly reduces its political goals while the other side expands its agenda, a dangerous situation arises where the end point of the negotiations is constantly shifted; that is, any concession does not become the basis for a final agreement, but turns into a starting point for the next demand.