Closing the Strait of Hormuz is important, but not enough. The oil market does not revolve only around “real supply,” but is influenced by “expectations.” If the disruptions last only a few days, a week or two, the market will absorb the shock to some extent—due to reserves, alternative routes, and psychological management, an article in the Iranian Khabaronline newspaper states.

“What should Iran do in that case?

The main point of pressure is elsewhere—in the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus. Israel is seriously dependent on oil being supplied via this route.

Israel’s oil imports from Azerbaijan have reached 94,000 barrels per day in 2025, which is 31% more than the previous year.

Azerbaijani oil accounted for 46.4% of Israel’s total oil imports, which is an unprecedented figure. Simply put, almost every second barrel of oil imported by Israel comes from Azerbaijan.

If this route were disrupted, it would directly affect Israel’s refineries, transportation, final prices, and security of deliveries. The advantage of the Caspian Sea in this regard is that, unlike the Persian Gulf, it is not under direct and close US control. The geographical distance, operational complexity, and multi-level nature of the routes mean that limited but precise actions would have a greater deterrent effect than a short-term blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Azerbaijan plays a key role here. It has been repeatedly stated that Israel has used Azerbaijani territory and its intelligence infrastructure in the war against Iran. For example, the use of the Hermes drone from [Azerbaijan’s] Nakhchivan [exclave] was a precedent for actions against Natanz. In such circumstances, Iran could apply counter-pressure in Israel’s most vulnerable sector: energy.

Turkey should also be treated with attentiveness and caution. Azerbaijani oil from the Caspian Sea reaches [Turkey’s] Ceyhan via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, from there it is transported by tankers to the Mediterranean Sea, and then to Israeli ports.

This means that Israel’s energy supply chain depends not only on the Persian Gulf, but is linked also to the Caucasus and Turkey. From this perspective, if tensions in the Caspian Sea are limited and controllable, Turkey will likely be content with a political protest, since practical intervention will cost it dearly and threaten its own interests,” the aforesaid article adds.