Armen Ayvazyan PhD (History), D.Sc. (Political Science)

Yerevan, March 3, 2026

With the deployment of additional U.S. Marine Corps units, elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, and elite special operations forces to the Middle East (estimated at up to 10,000 personnel), discussions in expert and media circles have once again intensified regarding potential scenarios for the seizure of Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf. The focus is on islands that serve as key nodes, critically important both for energy infrastructure (most notably Kharg Island) and for regional maritime lines of communication (Larak, Qeshm, Abu Musa, as well as Greater and Lesser Tunb).

The question, however, is not whether such an operation is theoretically feasible, but under what conditions it could succeed and whether it would turn into a costly and militarily and politically high-risk undertaking for the attacking side. Answering this question requires examining the historical experience of major amphibious and airborne operations of the 20th and 21st centuries.

Amphibious Warfare as an Instrument of War: Lessons from History

The experience of amphibious operations in World War II and subsequent periods demonstrates that their success has never been determined by any single factor: neither troop strength, nor surprise, nor even firepower—although each of these is of decisive importance. In every case, success depends on a complex system of conditions, the failure of any one of which can jeopardize the entire operation.

Notably, even the most famous and formally successful amphibious assaults often came close to failure.

The German airborne invasion of Crete in May 1941 marked the first strategic airborne assault in history. German paratroopers, dropped in daylight under intense defensive fire, suffered heavy losses within the first hours: by various estimates, in some units casualties during the first day reached 30–40%, while total German losses for the operation amounted to approximately 6,000 killed and wounded. The outcome of the operation was determined by the capture of a single critical node—the Maleme airfield—which enabled the rapid airlift of reinforcements. This confirmed a fundamental principle: an airborne assault remains viable only if it can rapidly transition from an isolated force into an integrated element of a broader offensive system. It was therefore no coincidence that Hitler soon declared that “the day of the paratrooper is over” and effectively abandoned the large-scale use of airborne forces, directing instead that they be employed primarily as elite infantry. Thereafter, Germany no longer conducted major airborne operations, while rare attempts at limited tactical drops (notably in the Ardennes in 1944) merely confirmed this rule.

A very different but equally instructive example is the Battle of Tarawa in November 1943. U.S. Marines faced what appeared to be a limited objective—the seizure of a small atoll of approximately 3 square kilometers. However, errors in assessing tidal conditions, underestimation of enemy defenses, and insufficient pre-landing fire preparation forced assault troops to advance hundreds of meters under intense fire. On the first day alone, casualties were extremely high (by some estimates exceeding 1,000 killed), while total losses over three days reached approximately 3,200 killed and wounded. The Japanese garrison of roughly 4,500 personnel was almost entirely annihilated. The operation was ultimately successful, but at such a cost that Tarawa became a textbook example of an exceptionally expensive, nearly Pyrrhic victory.

The Normandy landings in June 1944 are often viewed as the opposite of Tarawa. Yet even here, success was achieved not so much by the landing itself as by an unprecedented concentration of resources, a sophisticated deception campaign, and, above all, effective logistics. On D-Day alone, Allied forces suffered approximately 10,000 casualties (killed, wounded, and missing), and at Omaha Beach the situation in the first hours came close to operational failure. However, once ashore, the Allies were able to build up their forces continuously: within a matter of weeks, more than one million troops and hundreds of thousands of vehicles had been deployed into France. Victory was achieved not by the landing per se, but by the rapid expansion of the lodgment into a full-scale offensive operation.

In the Pacific theater, a different pattern emerged. While at Tarawa the Japanese still relied primarily on shoreline defense, the battles of Iwo Jima (February–March 1945) and Okinawa (April–June 1945) demonstrated a shift to defense in depth. On Iwo Jima, U.S. forces sustained approximately 26,000 casualties (including nearly 7,000 killed), despite overwhelming superiority. On Okinawa, total U.S. casualties exceeded 50,000, while naval losses from kamikaze attacks became among the largest sustained by the U.S. Navy during the war. By abandoning attempts to destroy the landing force at the water’s edge and instead conducting deeply echeloned defense, Japanese forces turned amphibious assaults into prolonged and highly attritional campaigns.

A special case is the Soviet Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation of August 1945. Here, Soviet airborne and amphibious elements operated under fundamentally different conditions: as the Red Army advanced rapidly along the entire front, the defenses of the million-strong Japanese Kwantung Army collapsed. Within weeks, Soviet forces advanced hundreds of kilometers into Manchuria, while their losses amounted to approximately 10,000–12,000 killed, relatively modest given the scale of the operation. Under such conditions, airborne operations were not instruments of breakthrough, but tools accelerating an already unfolding systemic collapse.

Finally, the modern example of the Battle of Antonov Airport in Hostomel (February 24 – April 2, 2022) clearly demonstrated the limits of airborne operations in the presence of modern air defense systems and a battlespace characterized by a high density of fires. Despite initial tactical success, Russian forces sustained noticeable losses in helicopters and personnel during the approach phase (by various estimates, between two and four helicopters were shot down or damaged), while the airfield itself was rendered unusable for the reception of heavy transport aircraft. As a result, the key objective—rapid and continuous force buildup—was not achieved.

Key Patterns of Amphibious Operations

A comparison of these cases reveals several enduring patterns.

First, landing forces are critically vulnerable at the moment of insertion and during temporary isolation from main forces. Second, success depends less on the landing itself than on the ability to rapidly reinforce and sustain the contingent. Third, air and naval superiority are necessary but insufficient conditions; they must be accompanied by the suppression of enemy air defenses, missile systems, artillery, and other fire assets. Fourth, accurate assessment of enemy defensive capabilities is crucial: underestimation of the defender almost inevitably results in heavy losses.

In the 21st century, additional factors have emerged. The modern battlefield has become increasingly transparent due to drones and satellite reconnaissance, provided the defender or its allies possess such capabilities, as is at least partially the case for Iran. Naval vessels and transport aviation, especially helicopters, are highly vulnerable to long-range precision strike systems, while inexpensive drones can saturate even advanced air defense networks. As a result, amphibious forces are now vulnerable not only on the shoreline, but well before reaching it.

The Persian Gulf: Operational Environment

Applying these patterns to the Persian Gulf leads to several key observations.

The United States undoubtedly possesses significant technological superiority, including the capability to achieve air dominance. However, it does not enjoy uncontested maritime dominance within the confined waters of the Persian Gulf. Iran has developed an asymmetric defense system specifically designed to disrupt amphibious operations. This includes anti-ship missiles, naval mines, mobile missile platforms, unmanned systems, and a so-called “swarm fleet” of fast attack craft, as well as roughly two dozen small submarines.

Geography further complicates the situation. Many of the islands are small, rugged, and fortified, effectively turning them into “Iranian Iwo Jimas.” The confined maritime space and high density of weapons systems increase the vulnerability of naval forces already during the approach phase. Moreover, Iran’s southern coastline—from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz to the Gulf of Oman—extends approximately 2,250 kilometers and is characterized along much of its length by mountainous terrain close to the shore. In effect, this entire coastline constitutes a large natural defensive barrier favoring the defender.

Under such conditions, any landing force would inevitably face a combination of artillery and missile fire, drone strikes, mobile anti-armor systems, and prepared defensive positions. In effect, this would no longer resemble Tarawa alone, but rather a combination of Tarawa and Iwo Jima, augmented by modern technology.

Possible Scenarios and Their Limitations

Theoretically, the seizure of individual islands by U.S. forces is possible. However, this would require a comprehensive set of conditions: suppression of Iranian air defenses and missile systems, disruption of command and control, isolation of garrisons, and continuous logistical sustainment. In other words, such an operation could not be conducted in isolation, but only as part of a much broader campaign.

Such a campaign, however, appears highly problematic both in terms of U.S. force generation capacity and in light of current domestic and international political realities. Under present conditions, the United States is unlikely to be in a position to conduct a prolonged large-scale war against a state such as Iran without major resource reallocation and domestic mobilization. At the same time, neither the political will nor public consensus for such a war appears to exist.

Moreover, unlike operations against Iraq or Yugoslavia, this scenario involves an adversary with substantial military capabilities, strategic depth, and the ability to conduct costly asymmetric strikes against critical U.S. and allied infrastructure across the region. In other words, any amphibious landing on Iranian territory would not constitute a discrete military action, but rather a potential trigger for a large-scale regional escalation with highly unpredictable dynamics.

The lack of reliable NATO support, growing strategic overstretch, and the vulnerability of U.S. military infrastructure in the Gulf further constrain decision-making options. Any attempt at a “limited” amphibious operation risks rapidly exceeding its initial scope—precisely because, for Iran, such a conflict would be existential in nature.

If such an operation were conducted while Iran retains its missile capabilities and depth of defense, it could evolve into a scenario resembling Iwo Jima or Okinawa—albeit under modern technological conditions and with the added factor of Iranian numerical superiority in the theater. In such a case, U.S. losses could be substantial, while the strategic payoff would likely remain limited.

Conclusion

Historical experience leads to a clear conclusion: amphibious operations succeed when they consolidate already achieved superiority at the operational or theater level, and become highly risky when expected to produce a decisive breakthrough.

For this reason, the seizure of Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf could only be effective if Iran’s defensive system were already significantly degraded prior to the landing. Otherwise, such an operation risks turning into a prolonged, costly undertaking with uncertain outcomes or, more likely — a complete failure.

In other words, amphibious operations do not create victory. They only prepare or consolidate it.

P.S.

This article does not examine broader counteroffensive scenarios of Iran’s response to an attempted seizure of its territory, including a ground offensive into Kuwait (with the support of Iraqi Shia forces) with further advance into Saudi Arabia, the insertion of amphibious forces or special operations (commando) units into Bahrain, as well as coordinated Houthi offensives from the west against the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Note. This article was originally published in Russian in the Yerevan-based newspaper Golos Armenii (“Voice of Armenia”) on April 1, 2026.