The processes related to the statement [demanding the resignation of the government] by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Armenia could not but have a negative impact on the security system, and we saw their bitter consequences in May, in the form of the well-known situation that came about in the Sotk-Khoznavar sector. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said this Tuesday in the National Assembly while presenting the program of the new government.

According to him, the situation was unusual when the aforesaid statement by the General Staff of the Armed Forces in February created a risk to involve the Armenian army in politics, and the process of getting out of this situation took more than a month.

The PM recalled that after the 44-day Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) war in the fall of 2020, the conversations about the need to change the form of government and return to the semi-presidential system became more active.

"The question arises whether the mechanism for reducing public tension through elections would work just as effectively in the case of a semi-presidential system. It is not a fact that the parliamentary system showed its incompetence in connection with the crisis over the Karabakh issue. Everything must be weighed well," said the Prime Minister.

Pashinyan suggested that if there were an opportunity to hold elections in 1998 according to the 2021 scenario, then all future processes in Armenia could have gone differently. "Then the [First] President resigned, and all this was done without taking into account the opinion of the people, and the issue of the Karabakh [conflict] settlement was removed from the sphere of public discussion, which created problems.

From the very beginning of the negotiation process, Azerbaijan has clearly worded its goals. Baku believed that Karabakh [(Artsakh)] and especially the regions were part of Azerbaijan. For it, there is no Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, and moreover, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. They have always pursued the goal of gaining control of Karabakh and the regions; and if this is not achieved through negotiations, then to achieve it by military means.

It was not like that in our rhetoric. We focused on the issue of international recognition of Karabakh. But many considered it treason, citing the December 1, 1988 decision according to which Nagorno-Karabakh should have been recognized as part of Armenia.

Later another resolution appeared: territories in exchange for status. There were people who had considered this treason, too.

There was also a resolution in the form of conceding some territories of Armenia in exchange for the joining of Karabakh to Armenia; this was also considered treason.

Azerbaijan's rhetoric was the same everywhere and always, whereas Armenia's approaches were different in the country, in the external environment, and around the negotiating table. There was no answer to the question of what we will do if we can’t reach an acceptable solution to us at the negotiating table. This systemic problem has had a serious impact," the Armenian PM added.