Iran's recent military exercises on the Arax River and its diplomatic mission in Armenia concern issues beyond the Nagorno-Karabakh war.

Foreign Minister Amir-Abdollahian's three-day visit to Armenia and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) exercises on the Aras River indicate a change in Iran's strategy toward its northwest region. While important in themselves, Iran's recent diplomatic and military initiatives in the Caucasus reflect not only its approach to its northwest region after the Nagorno-Karabakh war, but also its efforts to counter foreign interference and what it defines as separatist movements within its borders and among its neighbors, Alexander Nachman wrote for The National Interest.

"While Iran has maintained an official policy of neutrality vis-à-vis Armenia and Azerbaijan since the fall of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s interference on the side of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh War, which ended in 2020, has since prompted Iran to provide greater support to Armenia. Iran’s interest here is twofold. On the one hand, Iran has an existential interest in maintaining the integrity of its neighboring borders, which have shifted at various times in the country’s history, particularly in the north, as both Armenia and Azerbaijan were once part of Iran. On the other hand, maintaining border security mitigates foreign interference and separatist resistance. But a resurgence of violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan in September and October of this year overlaps with widespread protests in Iran, as well as armed conflicts in Kurdistan, both of which it blames on foreign meddling and separatist rebellion," he said.

On October 22, the IRGC and Foreign Minister Amir-Abdollahian completed a military exercise on the Arax River and a diplomatic trip to Armenia, culminating in the opening of a consulate in Kapan. During the trip, Amir-Abdollahian discussed with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian the need to preserve and develop the North-South corridor, which will function as a transit route between the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea via Armenia and Georgia; he also stressed that Tehran is against any change in the region's borders. Amir-Abdollahian's statement on border changes directly relates to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, and Turkey and Azerbaijan's parallel efforts to develop the Zangezur corridor, which would pass through Armenia's southern border and give Turkey direct access to Central Asia, minimizing Iranian influence.

In late October, Pashinyan also met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Raisi to resolve these issues diplomatically, with Raisi opposed to the Zangezur corridor. At present, because of the war in Ukraine, the Zangezur corridor would be a much-needed East-West alternative. Nevertheless, Iran supported the North-South corridor because it would benefit more from the Persian Gulf-Black Sea transit route than from the East-West route in the Caucasus. The Zangezur corridor would also affect Russian and Turkish interests.

The IRGC's simultaneous military exercises on the Aras River reflect two pressing problems in Iran. The first problem is related to the Zangezur corridor, which may create interferences on the Iranian-Armenian border. An additional problem is presented by some Iranian lawmakers regarding the Israeli presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Mohammad Safai, a representative of Rezavi-Khorasan Province, stated: “The Zionists are seeking to undermine the Islamic Republic’s influence in Central Asia through this [presence]. But they will never succeed.” And Hasan Hemmati, a member of the Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, added, “This exercise was a show of force whose message is peace and friendship for the neighboring countries and a decisive response to any threat for the enemies” It should also be noted that on October 24, after the above statements, Iran claimed to have arrested ten agents working for Israel.

But these events should also be understood in the context of current domestic politics, in terms of ongoing protests and armed conflict in Kurdish regions. During his speech in Armenia, Amir-Abdollahian referred to Mahsa Amini: “The death of Mahsa Amini affected everyone,” he announced, going on to characterize the reaction of the protestors as “violent” and “unacceptable.”

The situation is complicated by the fact that Amini's cousin serves as a fighter for Komala, the exiled Iranian Kurdish opposition party based in Iraq. However, he denies that she had any connection to the group. Amini's uncle is also the head of the Sunni community in Sanandaj, an almost entirely Sunni city, where he protested earlier this year against the posting of banners for the Shiite Eid al-Adha holiday. These ties underscore ongoing tensions between Iran's Kurdish regions and the central Iranian government, as well as the conflict in the northwest as a whole, a historically rebellious region where the government has sought to dominate and subjugate Kurdish tribes.

The human cost of the government's efforts to dominate the northwest, especially after the protests began, should not be underestimated. Moving beyond Iran's borders, much of the recent violence has been concentrated in Iraqi Kurdistan, where exiled Kurdish opposition groups such as Komala are based. Since late September, the IRGC has hit these bases, where at least sixteen people have been killed and more than fifty wounded in one attack.

Using a variety of strategies, Iran is trying to secure its northwestern borders and generally dominate the northwestern region. Whether the threat is Israeli, Turkish, Kurdish, or Azerbaijani, real or imagined, it is important to understand this policy and its implications in the broader domestic and international context. It should also be noted that foreign intervention, while not always the cause of unrest and sometimes exaggerated, has been a historical reality. Iran's conflicts in the Northwest are hardly recent. But increased security measures in the region are directly linked to domestic developments, which in turn have implications for regional politics for the Caucasus and Kurdistan and world trade in relation to North-South and East-West trade.

"The human cost of the government’s efforts to dominate the northwest, especially since the protests began, should not be understated," the author noted.