“From the third day on I already realized that we would not win the war,” Robert Kocharyan, the second president of Armenia, said in an interview given to TV5 television on Sunday—and regarding the 44-day Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020.

“On the second day I was in Karabakh, and what I saw convinced me within a day or two that we would lose this war. I stayed in Karabakh for two weeks; every day, through [former Karabakh presidents] Arkadi Ghukasyan and Bako Sahakyan, I tried to urge [then serving Karabakh president] Arayik Harutyunyan to do everything possible to stop the war. It was obvious that we were losing.

I even suggested then that at that time we meet — with former [Karabakh] presidents together with the sitting president — even though my attitude toward Arayik Harutyunyan is well known. He should not have been in that presidential post, but nevertheless I myself went, proposed [it], and I had a concrete plan of action for what needed to be done.

And from the point of view of organizing the defense, I had very specific proposals, and in parallel, of course, to do everything to stop the war as soon as possible. He [i.e. Arayik Harutyunyan] refused, did not want to meet, and through Bako Sahakyan conveyed the following: ‘If I meet with Kocharyan, the prime minister of Armenia [i.e. Nikol Pashinyan] will ‘eat’ me.’ That is literally what he said — ‘he will ‘eat’ me.’ At that time they feared meeting and discussing the matter with me less than they feared Azerbaijan during the war,” Kocharyan said.

Asked why he had the impression that the Armenian side was losing the war, Kocharyan replied: “I did not see normal management of the army; it simply did not exist. Because prior to that there had been such changes in the command structure, and people were appointed to key positions who were not suited for this war. And the personnel policy was as follows: he did not trust the army and wanted to have loyal people in important positions in the army. But a loyal general or a loyal senior officer is not always the officer who has sufficient skills to achieve victory in war. There were widespread personnel changes and loyalty was at its base. Issues related to army supplies were generally poor.

Before the war it was announced that the airspace was closed. It absolutely was not.

One of the most important circumstances was the disgraceful mobilizations that were carried out in Armenia. It would have been better if they had done nothing at all than what they did. People were being gathered, and on the third day those people ended up at the front. The existing military units, such as battalions, were not being replenished, but new units were being created and set to the front on the third day.

You must ensure combat cohesion for at least two to three weeks. My relatives were conscripted; for example, a very close relative of mine was conscripted, and on the second, third day of the war he found himself on the front lines, in a [military] company where no one knew anyone at all.

You cannot gather strangers in one place, form, for example, a battalion, and send [it] to the war the next day. You are simply sending those people into the meat grinder. At least two weeks are needed that you conduct combat harmony training so that people get to know each other, the commander understands what kind of commanders the subordinate commanders are, what knowledge they have," the second president of Armenia announced.