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NEWS.am interviewed a leader of Georgian Republican opposition party, political analyst Ivlian Khaindrava.

Q.: Mr. Khaindrava, it is already a year since 2008 August war broke out in Caucasus. The international tension relatively eased, however no significant logic in Russia and Western countries’ relations is notable, plus the strategic competition has speeded up the process. Now, a year after the war, please, name its major outcomes…

A.: A year after the Russian-Georgian war, it is still difficult to name the winner. Even the ones formally stood to gain have wealth of problems, caused by the war. Unfortunately, it is a fact that Georgia lost everything possible (and impossible). The compound issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s reintegration turned into a distant and vague prospect; Russian military presence in Georgia (within its internationally recognized borders) increased qualitatively and quantitatively; optimistic expectations of Georgia to join NATO also moved away for uncertain period, as well as credibility to Georgia as reliable and stable partner on international arena was undermined.

Eventually, from internal policy viewpoint, the war was a prerequisite for Saakashvili’s de-legitimation started in November, 2007 when the protest action was roughly repressed and independent “Imedi” TV Company was demolished. The list can go on, but it will suffice to sum up saying that Georgia today is more vulnerable in all terms, than couple of years ago.

Q.: What has changed in the world?

A.: Appropriate formula was derived in international politics in response to August war: Georgia’s irresponsible actions provoked Russia’s counteraction. Ambassador Tagliavini’s Commission at EU was expected to provide a report with more accurate answers to these questions by August 1, but asked for 2 months prolongation. Refuting violence, as means of conflict resolution, it is worth mentioning that invasion into neighboring territory compromises more the fragile international security, than the military operation against a split region.

In any case, there is no excuse for the both.

That is why West was more concerned with Russia’s actions rather than that of Saakashvili. The new U.S. Administration began to “reloading” relations with Russia, the dialogue within the framework of NATO-Russia is restored, and the latter was not expelled from G-8. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Georgia (and Ukraine) showed Americans are not going to leave their allies in the whim of fate, as well as that small countries are not determinative in global politics. This is a (severe) lesson for small countries.

Q.: How did the war affect Armenia and Azerbaijan? What influence it had over Russia’s positions and situation in Transcaucasia in terms of Karabakh peace process?

A.: I think neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan drew any political dividends from the August war, on the contrary. The qualitative fortification of positions of Russia in South Caucasus (including the military) makes Yerevan and Baku even more Moscow-dependant.

The Medvedev-Putin tandem eagerly tends to newly consolidate its priority in Karabakh peace process endeavors. That is why so-called ‘Madrid principles’ were voiced officially nowhere but in Moscow. Now it is no secret, whose interests Russia will head as cornerstone in this process. It is a real pity that the three South Caucasian states are again like “Swan, Pike and Crayfish” though due to objective reasons, Georgia has concurring interests with Azerbaijan (some others – with Armenia). However, no one can expect Aliyev to rush in the gulf with Georgia for these collective interests.

Q.: U.S. launched initiative of Armenian-Turkish border gate opening. Do you think Armenia-Turkey rapprochement is possible? And what will Georgia gain or lose as a result?

A.: Opening of the Armenian-Turkish border gate was a breakthrough for both bilateral relations and region on the whole. It is definitely possible to reckon Georgia’s transit income reduction, but political advantages are far overweighing the losses, and there is no need to calculate: thus regional security reinforcement is of priority. However the issue is so burdened with a number of underlying problems (like Genocide recognition, NKR conflict unsettlement, unique opinion of Russia and Iran, etc.), that the prompt success via “football diplomacy” is not expected.

In addition, I have the impression that public opinion (particularly in Armenia and Azerbaijan) is behind these political initiatives. However, the fact itself that the issue is on agenda – is positive.

Q.: Presently, few experts do not rule out the possibility of a new was in Caucasus. How probable this scenario is?

There is a bare possibility of a new Russian-Georgian war. But I have to admit that am not a good forecaster in this field: in summer 2008 I also certain the war will not be unleashed, but missed. My problem (or luck) is that I am unable to catch Messrs Saakashvili, Putin, Medvedev and their warriors’ logic. I can only add that if the world again “outsleeps” the Russian-Georgian war, all international organizations, councils, and alliances will not worth a dime. For me the matter, why Sarkozy made a Paris-Moscow-Tbilisi shuttle visits on August 20, 2008 (post factum) and not, say, August 2 (i.e. before) – when the disastrous events’ development could be prevented, is left in abeyance…

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