Ankara has quietly finalized a deal to resell the S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile systems it purchased from Russia to the United Arab Emirates. The deal could dramatically reshape the air defense architecture in the Persian Gulf, DEFENCE SECURITY ASIA reports, citing Turkish media.

If the transfer is confirmed, it would resolve the most painful crisis in Turkey’s relations with NATO, which emerged after the purchase of the Russian systems in 2017. As a result of that decision, Ankara lost its place in the international F-35 Joint Strike Fighter fifth-generation fighter program, and Turkey’s defense industry lost contracts worth about $9 billion.

Abdulkadir Selvi, a columnist for the pro-government newspaper Hürriyet, said that the “technical and procedural issues” had been settled overnight, and an official announcement of the deal was expected at any moment, but was postponed at the last minute.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed that Moscow is holding active talks on reselling the systems to a third country, calling the matter “extremely sensitive.” At the same time, Russian sources noted that the idea is generally viewed “in a positive light.”

However, on July 18, former Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar, who now heads the parliamentary committee on national defense, issued a sharp public denial, stating unequivocally: “We did not say and are not saying that the S-400s are being sent to the UAE.”

The contradiction between leaks from pro-Kremlin circles, signals from the Turkish press, and a direct denial from lawmakers underscores the high diplomatic sensitivity of the issue. The deal simultaneously touches on U.S. sanctions law, Russian export controls, and the strategic posture of the Persian Gulf states.

The stakes here go far beyond an ordinary arms trade. Under Section 1245 of the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2020, Turkey’s receipt of the F-35 is directly tied to Ankara’s complete renunciation of ownership or operation of S-400 systems in any form.

Six fully built and paid-for F-35A fighters with a total value of about $480 million remain in long-term storage in the United States, a direct casualty of the decision to remove Turkey from the program in 2019.

At the same time, President Donald Trump, during the NATO summit in Ankara (July 7–8, 2026), signaled that he is ready to lift sanctions under CAATSA (“Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act”). He told reporters that Washington does not want to “impose sanctions on friends” amid warming bilateral defense ties.

For the UAE, integrating Turkish S-400 systems would provide a long-range interception layer against Iranian ballistic missiles and drones. At the same time, Abu Dhabi would avoid directly falling under CAATSA sanctions, which it would face if it purchased the systems directly from Russia.

It is worth noting that these reports have not yet received official confirmation. The information is based on leaks in Turkish media and signals from Russian diplomats, rather than official statements from Ankara, Abu Dhabi, Moscow, or Washington.

Deal structure: Turkey’s resale route and uncertainty in the Gulf

Sources in Turkish media close to government circles describe the resale as a way to turn four S-400 battalions (purchased in 2017 under a $2.5 billion contract) from a permanent problem into a diplomatic asset.

One of the leading specialized defense portals claims that a trilateral agreement has already been reached. According to this version, all four Turkish regimental S-400 sets will be transferred to the UAE Air Force as part of a package linked to enhanced security guarantees from the United States.

At the same time, some Turkish outlets mention Qatar as an alternative recipient, indicating continuing uncertainty about the final destination in the Persian Gulf.

Among the other options being discussed is a scheme involving storage or phased deployment of the systems in Dubai. Such a structure would make it possible to formally satisfy the legal requirements of U.S. sanctions law without a full and unconditional transfer of operational control.

The original 2017 contract provided for a 45% advance payment by Turkey, with the remaining amount covered by a Russian state loan. This means that before the systems can be legally transferred to a third party, Ankara and Moscow must fully settle their mutual financial obligations.

The first S-400 components arrived in Turkey in July 2019 — just days before Washington officially removed Ankara from the F-35 program.

At the same time, the systems were never integrated into Turkey’s layered Steel Dome air defense system and remained in storage. The lack of integration makes the physical transfer of the systems easier: complexes not embedded in the national air defense architecture are easier to redeploy without harming current combat readiness.

If the deal goes through, it will be the first case of a NATO member state re-exporting sanctioned Russian strategic air defense weapons to a partner in the Persian Gulf that is not part of the alliance.

Russia’s calculated stance: Kremlin approval and contractual restrictions

Moscow’s public position reflects a pragmatic approach: to preserve leverage over Ankara while avoiding the impression that Russia is losing control over exports of sensitive military technology.

Dmitry Peskov’s statement about “ongoing negotiations” without clarifying details allows Russia to shape the narrative while holding back the formal approval required for any legally binding deal.

Russian sources in comments to Middle East Eye described Moscow’s internal position with the words “why not.” This points more to pragmatic consent than enthusiasm, since the resale would not bring direct revenue to Russia’s defense industry.

The final decision rests with President Vladimir Putin. This underscores the strategic sensitivity of transferring S-400 technology, radar signatures, and command-and-control system data beyond the original contract.

According to Russian sources, any resale must fully comply with the terms of the original Turkish-Russian contract. This gives Moscow substantial leverage over the choice of destination, end-use conditions, and technical maintenance of the systems after transfer.

At the same time, Russia’s own S-400 production capacity is constrained by the needs of the war in Ukraine. This raises questions about Moscow’s ability to guarantee long-term deliveries of anti-aircraft missiles to a new operator in the Gulf. Constraints in ammunition supplies could reduce the strategic value of the S-400 for the UAE in repelling intense Iranian attacks.

Turkish denials and political calculations: Akar’s position and the final chapter of the F-35 story

Hulusi Akar’s direct denial on July 18 that the S-400s are being sent to the UAE sharply contradicts reports published by pro-government journalists just a week earlier.

Akar’s statement carries significant weight: he not only heads parliament’s defense committee, but also served as Turkey’s defense minister when the S-400s were purchased in 2017.

At the same time, Akar noted that the prolonged dispute with Washington over the S-400s is “close to resolution.” This indicates diplomatic progress, even despite his refusal to confirm a specific route for transferring the systems to the UAE.