By Armen Gevorgyan

The Armenian public had for a long time been indignant at the fact that the Armenian-Turkish protocols signed in Zurich on October 10 contained a point on a subcommittee of historians. The Armenian Diaspora showed a particularly violent reaction by holding rallies in Paris, Beirut and Los Angeles, the cities RA President Serzh Sargsyan visited during his pan-Armenian tour.

Meanwhile, Turkey, which was an eyewitness to the problems its partner in the protocols encountered on the way of pushing the documents forward to ratification by the Armenian Parliament, was complicating the situation day after day. Premier Recep Erdogan was adding to the intolerance by linking the protocols to the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who presented the documents to the Turkish Parliament, confidently listed Turkey’s preconditions incorporated in the documents. The Armenian public felt something of a shock. Were the Armenian authorities’ positions so weak that they were unable to respond? Frankly speaking, hardly anyone believed that the subcommittee of historians would not discuss the problems of Armenian Genocide. Even less people believed that the Armenian-Turkish process had nothing to do with the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. Everyone believed it was just “putting a brave face on a sorry business” or mere excuses.

Few people asked whether the Armenian representatives negotiating with Turkey could at all discuss the Armenian Genocide, while the RA Constitution and laws clearly read that the Armenian state must do its best to contribute to the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Or was not it dangerous for the Armenian authorities to conduct a dialogue with Turkey in the context with the Nagorno-Karabakh problem? Was it possible at all?

According to the RA Constitutional Court’s verdict, the reopening of the Armenian-Turkish border and establishment of Armenian-Turkish diplomatic relations, as well as any steps as part of implementation of the protocols can by no means challenge or thwart Armenia’s efforts to get the Armenian Genocide recognized. Simply speaking, the RA Constitutional Court only confirmed what the Armenian President and Foreign Minister had repeatedly stated: the protocols do not contain any preconditions concerning the Armenian Genocide. Henceforth, discussing the Armenian Genocide will be in violation of the RA Constitutional Court’s verdict.

In this context Turkey’s discontent is one more proof that Turks themselves think otherwise. And they really believed that the subcommittee of historians would disprove the Armenian Genocide, which would mean the Armenian nation’s historical collapse.

But the Turkish politicians disappointment over the RA Constitutional Court’s verdict is nothing compared with the blows Ankara received from Washington and, later, from Moscow. Both the centers destroyed Turkey’s hopes for the Armenian side’s defeat in the Nagorno-Karabakh process in the context of the Armenian-Turkish dialogue. In fact, Ankara planned to use the Armenian-Turkish border problem as a means of pressure on Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. This strategy is not a new one. Blockade was a means of pressure before, whereas it is the possibility of its being removed in exchange for concessions now. However, Turkish Premier Recep Erdogan’s meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Moscow and, later, with U.S. President Barack Obama in Washington showed that the “centers of power” have different views of the problem. The Russian Premier plainly stated that it would be strategically and tactically wrong to link the two problems. President Barack Obama did not make any statement, but events that took place in both the United States and Turkey might be regarded as a similar response.

So Turkey received a clear and powerful signal that the reopening of the Armenian-Turkish border and establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations were independent of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. The world capitals gave signals concerning Nagorno-Karabakh, while a signal concerning the Armenian Genocide was received from Yerevan. The Turkish side’s reaction was quite predictable. They threatened to suspend the dialogue, which meant that no one but they saw preconditions in the protocols. So Ankara has to take a different view of the Zurich documents if, of course, it is really seeking reconciliation with Armenia, but not fishing in troubled waters – Turkish politicians’ favorite business. We can see proofs of this not only in the South Caucasus, but also in the Middle East.

T.P.