The European Parliament has published a document on Armenia-Azerbaijan relations. It examines the wars that took place in Nagorno-Karabakh, the current state of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the bilateral ties between the EU and Armenia as well as the EU and Azerbaijan.

Addressing the likelihood of a long-term peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the document notes that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government has already spent considerable political capital following the defeat in Karabakh.

It emphasizes that Pashinyan’s political vulnerability was demonstrated by his ruling Civil Contract Party’s poor results in the March local self-government elections. Despite the government’s declining public support, its political opponents still lag behind. Any further concession to Baku, even more so if it takes the form of a constitutional amendment, will be used by Armenian opposition parties as political ammunition ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2026.

In this campaign, political opposition parties and Armenian diaspora organizations may find an ally in Russia, a former Armenian ally and security provider. According to Russian media, President Vladimir Putin has tasked one of his closest aides, Sergei Kiriyenko, to “advance Russian interests” in Armenia.

Pashinyan continues to promote his vision of “Real Armenia,” as opposed to what he calls “Historical Armenia.” In this context, Pashinyan had already announced his intention to adopt a new constitution, now promoted as the beginning of Armenia's “Fourth Republic.”

“However, a constitutional referendum would still need to follow, possibly in autumn 2026, or in 2027. In principle, a new constitution would need to be approved by popular referendum, by a majority of votes cast and a minimum of 25% of the total registered electorate, a benchmark which could be difficult to attain if the changes are perceived as a further imposition by Azerbaijan. Taking into account that slightly less than half of voters participated in the last parliamentary elections in Armenia, the opposition could simply campaign for a boycott, which, coupled with voters' fatigue, could be enough to declare the referendum null. To avoid this scenario, some have speculated that the government could hold parliamentary elections and a referendum in a single day (although legal reforms would be needed), or search for alternative avenues.

A failed constitutional referendum in Armenia, other than being a serious political blow for an already debilitated Prime Minister Pashinyan, would prompt accusations by Azerbaijan that Armenia is not ready for peace, and potentially fuel the most aggressive tendencies within the Azerbaijani establishment. On the other side, drawing out the signature of the draft agreement sine die may also imply missing the extraordinary window of opportunity for peace that is now open

In this unbalanced equation, where Armenia has more at stake and Azerbaijan openly declares that it is in no rush to conclude a peace deal, the position of third-party actors, even those with limited leverage, might be impactful. The outcomes of the 8 August US-led Washington summit are, in this context, highly significant. Other actors, mainly the EU and Türkiye, may play an equally important role in finding further avenues for consolidating the still-fragile peace process and work on parallel issues (such as border delimitation and connectivity), thus allowing both countries to start reaping peace benefits even before the definitive text is signed,” the document reads, in particular.