War With Iran Exposes the Limits of U.S. Military Power

The first and most obvious lesson is the effectiveness of precision strikes. Since Operation Epic Fury began on February 28, U.S. and Israeli forces have struck more than 15,000 targets without losing a single aircraft to enemy air defenses. (Five U.S. Air Force planes were damaged on the ground in Saudi Arabia by an Iranian missile, three by friendly fire, and one in a fatal accident.)

Those strikes were made possible by superior U.S. and Israeli intelligence. The U.S. fully leveraged its technological edge against Iran — albeit against a second-tier adversary. Yet even in such a one-sided war, air power has clear limits.

Despite the airstrikes, the regime has held on to power, and hardliner Mojtaba Khamenei became the new Supreme Leader following his father's death. The U.S. has also failed to secure nearly 1,000 pounds of highly enriched uranium.

The most effective way to topple the regime and seize nuclear material would be to deploy ground troops. The Pentagon has sent more than 2,200 Marines to the Middle East. Still, a full-scale invasion of Iran remains unlikely given fears of heavy casualties — a fact Iranian leaders appear well aware of, apparently betting they can outlast the airstrikes.

Another U.S. vulnerability is the depth of its ammunition stockpiles. The military fields advanced guided munitions but procures them in small quantities. Last year, the U.S. produced just 96 THAAD missiles, 54 Precision Strike missiles, and 57 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Replenishing stocks will take years and billions of dollars, leaving the country less prepared for a potential conflict with Russia or China.

Asymmetric warfare poses yet another serious challenge. Iran knows it cannot win in open battle, so it seeks to raise the economic and political costs for Trump by closing the Strait of Hormuz and attacking civilian infrastructure and U.S. bases in the Gulf. Iranian forces are exploiting vulnerabilities effectively — targeting early warning radars and deploying drones capable of bypassing or overwhelming conventional air defense systems.

The financial math also works against the U.S.: using $3.7 million Patriot missiles to shoot down $20,000–$50,000 Shahed drones is deeply inefficient. Ukraine developed $1,000 interceptors last year, but the U.S. never procured them. American forces and Gulf states are now scrambling to close that gap.

Iran's asymmetric advantage is especially stark in the Strait of Hormuz, just 30 miles wide at its narrowest point. Iran has used mines, missiles, and drones — including naval unmanned vessels — to close the strait. At least 18 commercial ships have been attacked in two weeks.

This has effectively halted shipping, which the International Energy Agency called the "largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market." World oil prices have surged, and U.S. stock markets have become turbulent, increasing pressure on Trump to end the war quickly.

The U.S. Navy is escorting tankers, but few countries are willing to operate where the American fleet itself is at risk. If Iran maintains control of the Strait of Hormuz, it will represent a humiliating defeat for the U.S. The only paths forward are diplomacy or a large-scale invasion to occupy Iran's coastline. The irony is that Iran has actually managed to increase its oil exports since the conflict began.

The Trump team has also been caught off guard by the regime's survival following the Supreme Leader's death, and by Iran's response of targeting the Strait of Hormuz — entirely foreseeable scenarios. Trump's management of the conflict has proven deeply ineffective.

Many of the identified weaknesses could be addressed through better procurement: scaling up munitions production and acquiring drones and dedicated air defense systems. But the problem of incompetent political leadership recklessly squandering U.S. military advantages on unnecessary operations can only be resolved at the ballot box.