YEREVAN.- Interview with Dr. Vahram Ter-Matevosyan who is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia.
There are indications that recently Turkey has slightly modified its foreign policy. Could you, please, contextualize Turkey’s foreign policy priorities in the South Caucasus?
Quite understandably, Turkey pursues different interests vis-à-vis each entity of the South Caucasian region. Hence, we can assert that there is no unified and integrated foreign policy of Turkey in the South Caucasus. The three UN member states, the two partially recognized states and one non-recognized de-facto state, which is recognized only in the level of the US and Australian state legislatures, have different rankings in the list of policy priorities of Turkey.
Turkey’s approach to these entities is largely based upon different identities & interests. It is often said that Turkey incorporates different identities in shaping its foreign policy – Middle Eastern, European, Caucasian, Balkan, Mediterranean etc. I argue that this assertion is partially accurate and moreover, each of those identities possesses sub-identities and understanding Turkey’s foreign policy is quite difficult if those sub-identities are not properly considered. No wonder, Turkey had any definite policy vis-a-vis those sub-identities in its 2008 abruptly proposed, and dead at its birth, Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform.
Hence, Turkey’s Caucasian identity has Georgian, Azerbaijani, Abkhazian, Armenian and other visible and invisible facets. Turkey’s historical legacy confirmed the existence of different identities and the current developments continue the inadvertent process of self-assertion. Even for the Armenian case, the last report by the European commission indicated for the first time the emergence of “crypto-Armenians” in the Eastern regions of Turkey.
How would you explain NATO’s position in the Armenian-Turkish relations?
Turkey represents interests of one of the leadings security alliances in the world. Being a member of the NATO does not logically lead to the assumption that Turkey’s policies in the South Caucasus are in line with the NATO principles which view the South Caucasian region as a strategically important one. From time to time, people pondering upon the Turkish-Armenian relations and the security in the South Caucasus tend to forget that Turkey has closed down not only the border with Armenia, that Turkey not only enforced a political and economic blockade upon Armenia, that Turkey not only illegally deprived landlocked Armenia from sea access, but Turkey has also closed down a border, which is a border between Armenia and NATO. It is therefore, to think of cooperative security with closed borders is a difficult enterprise to imagine.
Turkey’s blockade and a strive to isolate Armenia even further not only failed to resolve Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) conflict, but pushed the parties of the conflict far aside from each other, as its backtracking from the normalisation process further made Azerbaijan intransigent and not at all inclined to concessions. For almost two decades, Turkey’s position has exacerbated the situation in the region and created more dividing lines.
What about Turkey’s general position concerning the conflicts in the South Caucasus?
It is another aspect of Turkey’s role in the region. Turkey’s policies towards Abkhazia and Karabakh (Artsakh) are formed through different channels and therefore have different manifestations. Different ethnic and lobbying groups influence Turkey’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Abkhazia and Karabakh differently. On different occasions, Turkey has reassured its compliance with the territorial integrity of Georgia and Azerbaijan. Has this been a consistent policy? Not really.
Turkish governments came to occupy an entirely distinct position vis-à-vis Abkhazia, which Georgia considers as a break-away region. That policy is contrary to what Turkey pursues in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), which Azerbaijan considers as a break-away region too. Turkey is increasingly deepening its economic cooperation with Abkhazia simultaneously maintaining a strong presence in the Georgian economy, whereas Turkey not only maintains its border with Armenia closed, but also imposes political and economic blockade on Armenia and unequivocally supports the unconstructive position of Azerbaijan on the Karabakh (Artsakh) conflict.
