Armenia is not persistent in pushing forward its proposals for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov, First Vice-Chairman of the Association of Russian diplomats (ARD), who was Russian Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group in 1992-1996, wrote in an article entitled “Karabakh and the new OSCE Summit: are endless refusals a way to settlement?” in Dipkuryer.
In May 1994, through Russia’s mediation, the OSCE Summit in Budapest made the most substantial decision on Nagorno-Karabakh by instructing the OSCE Co-Chairs (Russia, United States and France, which have acted as Co-Chairs for 13 years) to negotiate an agreement on ceasefire with the parties to the conflict -Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. The OSCE then viewed Nagorno-Karabakh as one of the conflicting parties, which accounted for the negotiation format. Official Baku did not raise any objections in Budapest, and repeatedly signed documents with Stepanakert rather than Yerevan during the war of 1991-1994. Also, the main issue, Nagorno-Karabakh’s final status, is impossible to settle with Nagorno-Karabakh’s participation. Later, for fear Nagorno-Karabakh’s recognition, official Baku began ousting it from the negotiation process. Armenian failed to take that into account, while the OSCE forgot about its own decisions.
Nagorno-Karabakh has been out of Azerbaijan’s control for over 20 years, but Azerbaijan still considers it its part. Referring to its own Constitution, Azerbaijan does not even think of any referendum there.
“Azerbaijan is absolutizing territorial integrity, though this principle is not the Absolute,” Kazimirov writes.
According to him, the reality is complicated and contradictory. Occupation cannot be tolerated nowadays, but it was the result of the Azerbaijan leadership’s blunders in their desire for defeating Armenians and unwillingness to put an end to that war. However, threats of new war are even worse. There are no alternatives worse than war. On the other hand, Baku’s threats help Armenians to justify the “security zone round Nagorno-Karabakh,” using this factor in its negotiations for Nagorno-Karabakh’s status.
Azerbaijan’s appeals and preparations for war make it impossible to consider the conflict in a politico-legal rather than military aspect. On the other hand, it is unacceptable to Armenians to leave the reinforced lines.
Armenian radicals’ claims to the occupied lands, their strongly worded responses to Baku are weakening the Armenian side’s positions in the international arena. Yerevan is not persistent in pushing forward its proposals even when they are quite right.
“On the threshold of the Astana Summit, Dmitry Medvedev and Sergey Lavrov continue exerting efforts to draw the sides’ positions on the basic principles closer and achieve at least some improvement. A ‘road map’ is beneficial for ensuring the sides’ consistent and interdependent actions. However, it requires at least the lowest level of mutual confidence. Is it available? Baku has lately demanded that Armenians agree to the updated Madrid principles they [Armenians] accepted with ‘some reservations’,” writes the diplomat.
