Last spring, when the newly elected Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan stated Armenia’s readiness to establish relations with Turkey without any preconditions, inaugurated a new stage of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement. We would remind you that under President Robert Kocharyan Armenia proposed the establishment of relations with Turkey without any preconditions as well. Turkish President Abdullah Gul proved to be among the first to congratulate Serzh Sargsyan on his election as Armenian President. He expressed hope that Sargsyan’s victory would contribute to the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement.

The beginning proved to be really promising to say nothing of further hope-inspiring developments. Nevertheless, the Russian-Georgian conflict in the South Caucasus forced Turkey to initiate a more active policy – coming up with an idea of a Platform of stability and security in the Caucasus.

Early last September the Turkish leader Abdullah Gul visited Yerevan at the invitation of RA President Serzh Sargsyan to watch a football match between the Armenian and Turkish national teams. That significant visit added to the optimism over the improvement of Armenian-Turkish relations. Some expected the Armenian-Turkish border to be re-opened even before the second match between the two national teams. The news about the renovation work in the Armenian section of the Kars-Gyumri railway heightened the expectations. Alas, time showed the reality had fallen short of the high expectations, particularly those of the Turkish press, which was predicting the re-opening of the Armenian-Turkish border early in 2009. Moreover, a number of Turkish and other foreign newspapers even fixed the date. U.S. President Barack Obama’s maiden visit to Turkey was expected to bring about a fundamental improvement in the Armenian-Turkish relations. However, in the latter half of this April articles predicting the improvement of Armenian-Turkish relations vanished from the Turkish newspapers. Even a particular occasion, the then Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan’s visit to the Yerevan Summit of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), failed to stir up Turkish mass media’s interest in the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement. And, on the night of April 22, just on the eve of the Remembrance Day for the victims of the Armenian Genocide, in Switzerland, the Armenian and Turkish Foreign Offices, through the mediation of the Swiss side, issued a joint statement on Armenian-Turkish rapprochement on the basis of a road map. However, time showed that breakthrough to be an occasional one.

Gul-Erdogan duo

The Armenian-Turkish rapprochement process strikes the eye by its seemingly conflicting positions adopted by President Abdullah Gul and Premier Recep Erdogan. Specifically, Erdogan objected to Gul’s visit to Armenia. President Gul considered the action “Forgive us, Armenians” organized by a group of Turkish intellectuals quite appropriate. People are free to express their opinions in Turkey, he said. On the other hand, Premier Erdogan slated the action organizers, saying the Turks have nothing to apologize for.

At their meetings the Armenian and Turkish Presidents discuss the improvement of bilateral relations without any preconditions, while, on different occasions, Premier Erdogan states the Armenian-Turkish relations cannot be improved — nor can the Armenian-Turkish border be re-opened — as long as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains unsettled. This all suggests serious disagreements between the Turkish President and Premier. However, this is only at first sight. It is for many years since Gul and Erdogan have been party mates. In 2002, the Justice and Development Party led by Erdogan won the parliamentary elections in Turkey. Erdogan was to be appointed Premier. However, he had a previous conviction, and Abdullah Gul was temporarily appointed Premier. After relevant amendments to the Turkish legislation were made, Erdogan was appointed to the post. By the way, in 2007 he spared no effort for Abdullah Gul to be elected President.

Without further ado, were the Turkish President and Premier in real disagreement over Armenian-Turkish relations, the former would have faced serious problems because the Turkish Opposition is far from being enthusiastic about the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement. Moreover, we should not forget that it is the Premier that chiefly holds the reins of government in Turkey. Furthermore, Turkish Premier Erdogan is also leader of the ruling party. That is, if Gul’s approaches to this important issue are in conflict with Erdogan’s… At present, in the context of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement, the apparent Gul-Erdogan confrontation can be viewed as a carefully rehearsed performance for both inside and outside. President Gul shows the world that Turkey is a peace-loving nation seeking friendly relations with its neighbors. Specifically, it seeks to establish relations with Armenia without any preconditions. In his turn, Premier Erdogan assures both Turkey and Azerbaijan that Armenian-Turkish relations are not to be established as long s the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains unsettled.

Author of foreign-policy scenarios

After coming to power in 2002, the Justice and Development Party declared its foreign-policy priorities, including EU membership. The party emphasized the necessity for improving relations with the neighboring countries having different problems with Turkey. Turkey’s foreign policy motto was No problems with neighbors. Everything seemed to have succeeded – except for the case with Armenia. The then Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, who was to a certain extent involved in establishing contacts with Armenia, completed his mission by jointly issuing a statement on Armenian-Turkish rapprochement on the night of April 22, 2009, and got a different job this May. One gets the impression that Turkey has come to realize the necessity for the principal author of Turkey’s foreign-policy scenarios — Foreign Policy Advisor to Premier Erdogan, Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu — to enter the scene to be at the head of this very policy in the future.

It was Davutoğlu that directed the development of Armenian-Turkish relations. This May he was appointed Turkish Foreign Minister. No specific step has been made in the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement since he was appointed. However, statements on the necessity for improving the bilateral relations have repeatedly been made simultaneously with talks about regional stability, Turkey’s commitment to its No problems with neighbors policy. In his latest statements Mr. Davutoğlu made the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement conditional on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Second half of diplomatic match

The first half of the “football-diplomacy” match must have ended on April 22, 2009, when the Armenian and Turkish Foreign Ministers issued a statement on the improvement of the bilateral relations. The statement was supposed to speed the rapprochement process. But the opposite occurred: the process slowed down and eventually came to rest. Is the second half of the match finishing without actually starting? Where has the April activity in the negotiations vanished? Has Turkey’s desire to prevent U.S. President Barack Obama from using the term “genocide” become an obsession for that country? Or were there any other prerequisites? Say, Turkey was bewildered by the hysteria raised by Azerbaijan. In this case Azerbaijan turned to Russia to counterbalance the possible improvement in the Armenian-Turkish relations. To be precise, Azerbaijan simulated a process of drawing closer to Russia, which was a probable reason for Turkey’s slowing down the rapprochement process.

It is obvious, though, that Turkey wanted to retain its influence on Azerbaijan. First, it is a kindred nation considered Turkey’s younger brother, with Turkey devising far-reaching plans concerning it. Azerbaijan is rich in energy resources, and Turkey is taking advantage of the fact. The present energy projects are the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Erzerum gas main. And all this without the Nabucco project anticipated by Turkey, with a central role assigned to Azerbaijan. Foreign funds totaling US $4bln are to be invested in Turkey’s economy under the Nabucco project. After the project is launched, Turkey is expected to receive US $0.5bln for gas transit annually. One has the impression that the state of affairs is sufficient for Turkey to take its younger brother, Azerbaijan, into account.

May be the Turkish society is not yet ready to improve relations with Armenia? Or the Turkish nationalists’ pressure on Erdogan proved to be stronger than expected? Let us consider the series of trials of the Egenekon case. Numerous activists strongly objecting to Armenian-Turkish rapprochement are among the arrestees.

So we can suppose that by slowing down the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement process the Turkish authorities secured themselves against possible dangers coming from the local nationalists. Turkey’s recent actions are clearly indicative of its desire to extend its influence over the region – from energy mediation to assuming the role of mediator between parties having problems or even actually conflicting ones. It is an obvious fact, however, that a state wishing to extend its influence over another country has to establish contacts with it first. So we can suppose that Turkey will finally establish relations with Armenia unless any force majeure interferes. And it is difficult to say when this force majeure can interfere, all the more so that a number of international agencies and top-ranking officials state the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement process has come to rest. Specifically, the International Crisis Group stated the process could be revived in the coming two or three years. The U.S. Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group Matthew Bryza stated the process had slowed down.

Economic factor

Other analysts’ ideas that Turkey may re-open the border out of its economic interests (as the well-being standards in the country’s eastern parts [Western Armenia] can by no means be compared with those in central and western parts) failed to endure a time test.

Even the economic crisis failed to force Turkey to re-open the border. However, a country with a 70mln-strong population would hardly feel an appreciable effect of the market of Armenia with its 3mln-strong population. Besides, cargoes are transported from Turkey to Armenia through Georgia, and Turkish products reach Armenian consumers in any way. In this context, it is quite natural that a number of Turkish vilayets bordering on Armenia are strongly for the re-opening of the Armenian-Turkish border because it would enable them to improve their economic situation. The Kars vilayet stands out against them. The former Mayor of Kars collected 50,000 signatures for the re-opening of the Armenian-Turkish border. With the same end in view, public representatives have repeatedly applied to Ankara. Almost 90 per cent of the Kars population can be said to be for the re-opening of the border. In Iğdır, with its Mayor being Azerbaijani by tradition, the situation has radically changed after a Kurd candidate was nominated for the post – over 50% of the Iğdır population is for the border to be re-opened.

In lieu of epilogue or a touch of humor

Turkish State Minister Egemen Bağış tried to breathe new life into the tied-up Armenian-Turkish rapprochement process. After visiting Akdamar (Akhtamar) Island in Lake Van and the Holy Cross Church he made a curious statement. He proposed erecting a cross on the church and allowing religious services before Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan’s return visit to Turkey. Thus, the Turkish side tried to push its April 22 commitments into the background thereby creating a precedent in the context of the Armenian leader’s possible visit.

We can only welcome the fact that the Turkish authorities have come to realize the Arkhtamar church must have a cross on its dome and religious services must be held there. However, the Armenian side expects Turkey to fulfill its commitments. Later developments showed the Armenian side understood the statement and did not delay a response. At a joint news conference during Serbian President Boris Tadić’s recent visit to Armenia, RA President Serzh Sargsyan stated he would visit Turkey provided the border was unblocked or at least relevant measures were being taken. The Armenian leader had earlier made a similar statement, which was not in any way commented on by the Turkish side. Almost all Turkish media outlets considered the Armenian President’s statement to a strong-worded one. As regards comments, they proved to be extraordinary. According to the Turkish press, the Armenian President is setting preconditions for his visit to Turkey, whereas his Turkish counterpart paid a visit to Armenia without any preconditions. That is, Turkey views Armenia’s insistence on her fulfilling its commitments as a precondition.

A surprising interpretation indeed! It must be only sense of humor than can save the situation in this case.