A year has passed since the three-day war in the Caucasus. The causes of the tragedy can be yet discussed, whereas the result is obvious: Georgia lost any hope to regain control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As regards Russia, it extended its influence over the Caucasus, created a buffer zone round the North Caucasus by deploying two military bases in the former Georgian territory and enlarged its Black Sea borders thereby preparing a base for the Black Sea fleet, which is being ousted from the Crimea.

As to Georgia, after suffering defeat, it has not put up with the loss of its territories. While intensifying a political and military dialogue with the West, Georgia will seek a historic revanche. Georgia’s problems have assumed great importance on the international scene reflecting the real scale of the global competition between Russia and the United States, as well as Europe’s influence and position in this competition. It is also obvious that the military operations last August brought about serious changes in the picture of the region. Turkey’s initiatives in dealing with the Caucasian problems, the United States’ seeking to retain its influence on Azerbaijan and Armenia by intensifying its efforts in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process as well as Russia’s efforts to back up Baku – all the mentioned factors are obvious.

Thus, since last August, the Nagorno-Karabakh problem has been “in the thick of competition” for the region. The results of the August war – not local, but regional ones – depend on the outcome of this process.

The past period saw unprecedented changes in the general atmosphere of the negotiations for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. First, the confidential talks (some competent sources state that the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process is the closest political and diplomatic process in the world) that have been conducted over ten years have suddenly been made almost available to the public at large. The very event caused passions to run high and promising forecasts to be made. Secondly, the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement process made miraculous headway. Doubtless, it continues playing a key role in regional stability.

The conclusion is that there is no Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, but only an Armenian-Turkic one, is supported by one argument: Azerbaijanis identify themselves with Turks by making the thesis “one people, two states” a national ideological dogma. International mediators accept the thesis as they realize the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is impossible to settle without easing tension in the Armenian-Turkish relations. However, this solution, if a good one, meets with fierce resistance in Azerbaijan itself. They in Azerbaijan state the common Turkic policy aimed against Armenia and Armenians, as well as the ideological dogma, has failed. It is the reason for Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s demarche against Turkey’s attempts to reach an agreement with Armenia without considering Azerbaijan’s interests, as well as for Azerbaijan’s “show dialogue” with Russia, which proved to be a most serious impediment to the delicate Turkish-Armenian negotiations.

They are only interim results of attempt to start practical steps toward settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As to long-term results, they are impossible to forecast. They depend on score of scenarios on both the regional and international political agendas. Georgia may yet play a crucial role in the future processes in the South Caucasus. However, it must first get over the knockdown, decide on its situation and strategic priority tasks, understand the ways of accomplishing them, and set specific terms for that. It is obvious the Georgian political elite are incapable of accomplishing such medium-term tasks. So the United States will have to plan and accomplish this most difficult mission. Russia, Iran and Turkey can take advantage of the time the United State will spend on elaborating a new strategy for Georgia.

The priority of military presence, which guarantees the protection of political and economic interests, is a guideline for the key world players in any region, including the South Caucasus. This is the reason why the numerical strength and status of the troops which, according to the Madrid Principles, are to carry out a peace-making operation in the region, is a key issue.

At this point we should consider a philosophic rather than a political problem. A multinational state, just as a multinational family, cannot exist with bitter religious, territorial and historical conflicts. Divorce is inevitable. The reconciliation of the two peoples, which once formed part of a multinational state, requires historically ideological, spiritual, humanitarian and economic efforts. Two peoples are impossible to reconcile by force of arms, just as an armed neighbor cannot save a broken marriage. All that can be done under the circumstances is to protect one of the “parties being reconciled”, which is known to be weaker and may fall victim to the other side. That is why Russian peace-makers were openly defending Ossets and Abkhazians from Georgians, and Americans defended Albanians from Serbs. Naturally, both Russia and the United States were doing so out of their own interests.

Who and whom, from whom and for what sake is going to defend in Nagorno-Karabakh? This must be the Nagorno-Karabakh population’s major concern considering the international mediators’ intention to facilitate Azerbaijanis’ return to the conflict zone. What is more, both in the Balkans and in the Caucasus international peace-makers failed to keep the situation from developing into war. No matter who was to blame! At present, the West with its peace-making experience, namely, bombings of Sarajevo, and Russia, with its experience including a battle march to the Georgian capital and destruction (may be as a compulsory measure) of the Georgian Navy and infrastructures, propose a similar peace-making operation in Nagorno-Karabakh! Who can give any guarantees against war even if it is provoked under new circumstances — after Armenia, Azerbaijan or Nagorno-Karabakh upset the status quo?

Specific feature of such a war, with international peace-makers to find themselves in the thick of it, is that, unlike Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the military contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh cannot represent only one of the powerhouses. So, by definition, ensuring Nagorno-Karabakh’s security will not be its only task. The task is impossible to harmonize with specific geopolitical interests – either Russia’s or the West’s. As a result, the zone of struggle for influence may turn into zone of a peace-making operation conducted by competing powers. It is risky to expect such a military contingent to coordinate the protection of the Armenian (and only) population in Nagorno-Karabakh. The more probable scenario is an internationally drawn dividing line, which is presently the contact line between the Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces. But where will the line be specifically drawn? The most important question is: who can guarantee hostilities will not be resumed the day after the Azerbaijani troops come close to the Nagorno-Karabakh borders? Are they the forces that failed to maintain peace in the Balkans, Caucasus and other regions?

U.S. Co-Chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group (OSCE/MG) Matthew Bryza is frankly speaking of the prospective return of five regions forming a security belt round the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) to Azerbaijan at the initial stage, and, in five years or so, the Lachin and Kelbajar regions, which are the most important from the geostrategic viewpoint. This is a revelation in the context of long-lasting negotiations.

With this being so, mediators propose the preservation of the land corridor. In this case, the corridor will run though Azerbaijani territory. It is obvious that ensuring the security of the corridor must be one of the peace-makers’ tasks. Does not it imply control over the corridor in addition to ensuring its security? Who, and in what regime, will exercise control over it?

Numerous questions make experts doubt that a final agreement on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will be signed within the next few years. Of greater importance is the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh clearly stated it would not accept as legal any document not signed by an NKR representative. That is, the involvement of the NKR authorities (not of the Armenian or Azerbaijani communities) in the negotiations is an urgent and inevitable task to be accomplished by the mediators if they are really seeking a settlement.

One has the impression that the struggle for dominating the South Caucasus and, therefore, for advancing and developing various initiatives in the region, developing its policy and achieving its aims is the only factor escalating the situation in the region. Neither the Armenian side’s doing away with the security zone, introducing peacemakers into the zone region nor the results of a referendum — not be recognized by Azerbaijan — can make for the establishment of peace and stability in the region.

The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh can be considered a stalemate. Why? For the simple reason that the United States, Russia and Europe – all the three forces involved in the settlement process – are applying double standards. An example is the repeatedly described Kosovo precedent: the United States and the European Union (which officially recognized Kosovo, part of Serbia, an independent state) and Russia (which recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia) – they all rule out the possibility of recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state as they officially consider it part of Azerbaijan. On the other hand they realize the impossibility of enforcing this status on Nagorno-Karabakh.

Granting an interim status to the NKR and maintaining it by combined efforts is a way to destabilization, cashing in on the interests of one, two, three, four or even more players, which may not only cause an explosion in Nagorno-Karabakh but also expose the fragile “post-Kosovo” international architecturе.

NEWS.am Analytical Department