Iran has purchased – and expects delivery – of the S-300 system. Suffice to say that if that deployment were to go through, it would represent a major upgrade for the Islamic Republic’s military capabilities and a significant deterrent against possible US or Israeli action against their illicit nuclear program.

But Russia has, so far, held off on its sale of S-300 systems to Iran. Why? For one, the message that it sends reeks of bad-faith. But then again, Syria already possesses the advanced weaponry. More likely, Russia has avoided selling Iran the weaponry because some believe that the system would render an Israeli attack virtually meaningless, writes Eurasia Review.

Then comes the news that Russia is now considering selling the S-300 to Azerbaijan, which some see as a balancing act to its upgraded military ties with Armenia. It is no secret that Russia’s relations with Baku have improved considerably as of late, despite the fact that Azerbaijan and Armenia remain at odds over the Armenia-dominated ‘republic’ of Nagorno-Karabakh, another regional frozen conflict. Though Russia has long been considered the chief patron and ally to Armenia, Azerbaijan’s lucrative gas and oil deposits are crucial to Russia’s long-term pipeline chess game.

So it’s not much of a surprise that Russia would want to placate their counterparts in Azerbaijan after beefing up their presence in Armenia, which the Armenian leadership has billed as a guarantee of sorts against Azerbaijani aggression. Of course, few believe that Russia would risk its lucrative energy lifelines by actively assisting Armenia against Azerbaijan in the event of another outbreak of conflict, a sentiment echoed by EurasiaNet.

All of this may be true, but there could be another angle as well. The proposed sale of S-300s to Azerbaijan may portend the long-anticipated delivery of the systems to Iran. Why? Azerbaijan, incredibly, is considered a close (if somewhat quiet) ally to Israel, and there is a possibility that the Azeri government may be willing to give Israel limited access to the system. Russia undoubtedly knows that this is a possibility, but could be counting on it.

“Yes, we sold Iran the S-300,” they might respond to Israeli protests, “but we’ve also handed you a way to defeating them.” Israel did just that in late 2007 when it penetrated Syria’s S-300 monitored airspace to take out what many suspect to have been the beginnings of a Syrian nuclear program. Greater technical understanding of the S-300 may be what the Israelis would need to defeat the system once again.

Russia’s casual vending and deployment of the S-300 underscores the Kremlin’s desire to create points of stress and leverage in key areas of the world. Consider that the S-300 is now deployed in Syria, Armenia, Abkhazia, and likely soon to be sent to Azerbaijan. Iran is technically due for delivery of the system.

To be sure, the Russian strategy in every case seems to be maximizing its leverage against and between different countries – Iran and Israel, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia and the conflict regions, Western and Eastern Europe, and the like. Though the conflicts vary in scope, size, and geopolitical weight, they all share the commonality of Russian strings somehow attached and, ominously, the threat or the promise of weapons sales.

Beware of Russians bearing gifts – of weapons.