By Armen Gevorgyan

Armenia became a full international person the very moment the country’s leaders made the first step to normalize the Armenian-Turkish relations.

Personality is not an exclusively positive state. It is fraught with risks Armenia has not yet faced during its modern history. The risks in question require much deeper political analyses and forecasts, a totally different way of forming state and public systems.

Armenia supposedly made a “jump” into “real” regional politics under the pressure of objective processes, with the Russian-Georgian war being the most significant one of them. As a result, Russia enlarged and consolidated its southern borders and restored its international reputation (for showing weakness is that is most detrimental to Russia). With all this, however, Russia lost its strategic initiative in the South Caucasus. “Establishing peace” with Turkey thus became the only possible scenario of Armenia’s foreign policy, which immediately sensed various winds which were “tempered” by the Russian security umbrella before.

However, the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement is not a purely political process for Armenia and for the Armenian people. Nor can it be called a purely historical one. A most serious psychological barrier is an obvious factor, and overcoming this barrier can post factum be designated as demonstration of strength and political will. On the other hand, it was an involuntary step made by one aware of its own weakness.

Now that the actual sense of the regional developments is clear, it is worth addressing two mutually exclusive positions in the context of Armenia’s possible strategy.

The arguments presented by the proponents of a hard line are as follows: Armenia must not sign any agreement with Turkey. By doing so, it will challenge the result of the Armenian people’s centuries-long struggle for survival and, over the last few decades, for the recognition of the Armenian Genocide. The more radical forces’ arguments are that the Armenian people must demand the compensation for losses from Turkey in the future – for both material and territorial losses. This group rules out any linkage between the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement and the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. The two processes have nothing to do with each other, and any preconditions are inadmissible.

But what we actually see is that it is soft-liners that are implementing Armenia’s foreign policy. The very sense of their actions is to take every opportunity for a dialogue. It is not because of fully meeting the Armenian people’s interests that the soft and constructive line proved to be an option. The current foreign policy reflects the potential Armenia has managed to accumulate during its centuries-old history. To be frank, this potential has not proved to be great, which is an objective result as well.

What are the possible results of the “hard-line” and “soft-line” scenarios of the Armenian strategy? Does any "mean line’ exist?

The hard-line scenario, which provides for a status quo in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone and on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border as long as one wants, applying the same principle to the Armenian-Turkish confrontation in the international arena, may produce the following two results: the exhaustion of Armenia’s political, economic and demographic resources and, therefore, a war and collapse of Armenian statehood; or, joint capitulation on the part of Azerbaijan and Turkey. Let the reader estimate the two probabilities.

The soft-line scenario, which provides for the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations, with the status quo in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone to be simultaneously shaken against the international community’s guarantees, may produce two possible results as well: Turkey and Azerbaijan may either take advantage of the new state of affairs and increase their joint politico-military (Azerbaijan) and cultural and economic (Turkey) pressure on Armenia or, flattered by Armenia’s goodwill, contribute to the country’s prosperity. I do not think the reader will find it difficult to choose the more probable scenario.

As we can see, both the scenarios are equally dangerous for Armenia. So, by making statements and appeals, the proponents make it even more difficult to find the “mean line”, which, beyond doubt, does exist and is the only right way.

This course is a historical and strategic necessity for the Armenian people, a principal test in its modern history. This task is far from being a trivial matter, as it rests on one of the most intricate aspects of the Armenians’ national identity, namely, the Armenians’ double-aspect nature in the broad sense of the term, different spiritual mentality and real life priorities in Armenia and in the Diaspora. I would like to note that initiating and escalating a controversy over the current political processes in the region between representatives of Armenia and Diaspora will prove to be a fatal blunder for the Armenians, as such a controversy will actually be a conflict between the soft and hard lines, but not a result of joint search for the “mean line.”

Under the circumstances, we should admit that Armenia has failed a strategic task of establishing channels of communication with the Diaspora, which prevented the two sides from “joining their voices.” What we can hear now is a hubbub, with cries of despair, not a clear dialogue between the two sides having the same task, but different resources and fields of activities.

The Diaspora’s criticism against the Armenian authorities is counterproductive: it is not the emotions of the Armenians residing in the United States, France, Lebanon and Russia – no matter how strong and sincere they are – but the actual alignment of forces in the region, Armenia’s real potential and actual tasks of ensuring the Armenian citizens’ security that should be guidelines for Armenia’s official leaders. The Armenian authorities cannot have any other priorities. In this case, the Diaspora, as well as those speaking on its behalf, should clearly distinguish between their own priorities and Armenia’s state interests. However, it does not at all mean that the Diaspora’s activities for national interests will inevitably run counter to Armenia’s national interests. Quite the contrary…

The Armenian Diaspora’s consistent and relentless pressure on Turkey can and must facilitate the negotiations for the Armenian side. With its rather amorphous structure, the Diaspora is not subject to the same serious risks as the Armenian state and citizens, which occupy a specific, or rather, blockaded territory. Thus, the “mean line” provides coordination between Armenia and the Diaspora, application of two tactically different strategies, which is supposed to produce “a mean result”, equally acceptable to both Armenia and the Diaspora.

In their turn, the Armenian authorities, whether they like it or not, must convene a forum in the near future to hold open talks with Diasporan representatives, which would make them form a real – in place of the currently radiant — picture of the Homeland, Mount Ararat, national flag and anthem, Armenia’s interests and real potential. Forming channels of communication with the Diaspora, Diasporan mass media and active representatives is an urgent task of the Armenian Government. And this communication must not be a recurrence of Armenia-Diaspora festivals, which fill the belly, not the brain. Rather, this must be brainstorm communication, which will result in a realistic strategy of mutual assistance. The Diaspora must raise the issues of its tragic history and of the claims of Armenians’ worldwide in isolation from Armenia’s state policy. This policy is aimed at creating a favorable regional situation for the country’s economic development and reducing security risks.Armenia and Diaspora must for a “strategic pin” for Turkey. This is the only way of impeding the Azerbaijani-Turkish policy of “lumping everything together.”