October 04
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There are calls to judge the generals, but first of all, we need to judge the diplomats, especially the decision-makers, of course, in the future, political analyst Stepan Danielyan wrote on his Facebook page.

He, in particular, noted:

"It is very important to know the history of diplomacy, because there you can find diplomatic techniques that now and in the future are also used and will be used. Also, countries, having diplomatic schools, use the experience and skills built on the past. Simply put, each country has its own "handwriting," which cannot be faked, just like human handwriting.

We often liken the Russia-Turkey relationship to that of 1920, which is appropriate, but this relationship is not necessarily seen in the realm of relations between these countries. For example, the technique of Soviet-German relations in 1939 is also very interesting and may also have similarities in terms of thinking and tricks, in terms of today's Russo-Turkish relations.

Let's cut to the chase.

So, in 1939, when Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union approached Poland about providing a military corridor to help the Czechs, but Poland refused. It was a Polish-German honeymoon at the time, and the Poles said a Russian soldier would never set foot on Polish territory. At the same time, the USSR appealed to Britain and France, which possessed the most powerful military force in Europe (at least that was believed at the time), but these countries shirked such a commitment. In the end, Germany bribed Poland by ceding some Czech territory, and began to prepare to settle the Polish issues.

It was to Britain's advantage that Poland disappeared as a buffer and a Soviet-German clash took place. The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was concluded at that time. Poland was divided, great economic and military cooperation began, like now between Turkey and Russia.

The Soviet Union bought time, and France received the first blow.

The war between Germany and the Soviet Union nevertheless broke out, but later and in a different scenario.

This is very similar to today's Russo-Turkish relations. Both countries are buying time, but the West needed to eliminate the buffer between Russia and Turkey, which we and Georgia are, so that a direct confrontation could start. That was one of the goals of the Artsakh war. Now we or Artsakh are in the role of Poland. Like the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, in all likelihood there is also a secret Lavrov-Cavusoglu pact, which we will probably learn about in 100 years.

We can't say now how events will unfold in the future, but I am interested in the diplomatic handwriting and thinking.

If we had had a well-established diplomatic school, perhaps we could have avoided this development and events would have followed a different scenario. But not only did we not have this school, we don't have it now, and that is the most dangerous thing.

There are calls to judge the generals, but, first of all, we should judge the diplomats, especially the decision-makers, of course, in the future.

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