The result of any work (policy) depends not only on financial investments, but also on the motives and competence of the persons involved in the process of achieving the goal – a personal factor. At present hardly anybody doubts that Russia and the United States are waging an uncompromising struggle for influence in the post-Soviet area, including the South Caucasus. The result of the struggle will to a great extent depend on the professionalism of the two states’ diplomatic corps “stationed” both in the competition zone and at the coordinating centers in Moscow and Washington.

It should be noted that the American and Russian diplomatic strategies are radically different. Americans normally achieve their aims by means of public, sometimes even demagogic strategy, while Russians are widely experienced in backstage activities — collecting and using nonpublic information. However, Russian diplomats are in extremely strained circumstances in this field as well – other agencies and services are in charge of this field. There is no need to dwell on this topic.

Do we have to say once more that the initiative American diplomacy based on demagogic formulas, but loyally serving the United States’ interests, is succeeding in transforming the regional political and, which is most important, ideological picture to leave no room for any other activity. As a result, the three Russian Ambassadors (Vasili Istratov, Nikolay Pavlov and Vyacheslav Kovalenko) came off real losers in a game with their respective American counterparts (Anne E. Derse, John M. Evans, [replaced by Marie L. Yovanovitch] and John F. Tefft). The political trace left by the American diplomats can by no means be compared with Pavlov’s “tracelessness” in Armenia, Istratov’s having been “off-balance” in Baku and, though praiseworthy, but futile efforts of Kovalenko in Tbilisi.

Characters in any play are normally changed sooner or later. The new U.S. Administration launched a large-scale process of rotation of its diplomats in the South Caucasus as well as Coordinators in Washington. To judge by the candidates, it is well thought-out rotation in the context of the new situation in the region and the tasks to be accomplished by individuals with relevant practical experience.

To understand the logic of changes in the U.S. diplomatic corps in the region, one has to get a brief description of the changes that have taken place over this short period.

The principal event is, no doubt, the August war, which caused the United States to radically change the methods of its regional strategy. Russia demonstrated that diplomacy does not play any role for her when she feels an imminent tactical failure. At this moment arms come into play. The United States, which, by means of Ambassador John F. Tefft caused metamorphosis Georgia, marginalized the Russian factor by means of a subtle “game of chess” and returned Adzharia to Georgia by means of Russia itself, reckoned without what was the most important, namely, Russia’s reaction to a check to the king – an attempt to neutralize South Ossetia – which was to be followed by a checkmate in Abkhazia. Russia’s sharp response, which had nothing in common with diplomacy, challenged, or rather proved fatal to the results of efforts made by Mr. Tefft and U.S Government in Georgia for many years: from the dismantled military base in Senaki, which had been constructed and equipped on U.S. funds, to Russia’s final strategic control over communication lines (railway and motorways) in South Ossetia as well as over the seaways on the Black Sea coast of Abkhazia. Tefft’s failed efforts put an end to the United States’ illusions about its possible control over the entire region, with Georgia as its communication and transit junction. The United States is obviously shifting emphasis now, being aware of the fact that Georgia’s losing its strategic importance means an end to the U.S. regional strategic initiative based on the formula Georgia is a democratic beacon and foreign-policy guideline.

The prospective appointment of Matthew Bryza as U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan means only one thing: Washington is gradually shifting the center of its influence to Baku. Over the recent years Matthew Bryza has carried out tremendous work to coordinate the U.S. policy in the South Caucasus (his field of activities has been Georgia’s domestic political problems, debates over the regional agenda with Russia, the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process and the West’s energy priorities in the Caspian region). It is not surprising as it is Azerbaijan that was a major obstacle to the transformation of the U.S. regional policy, which was aimed at “balancing” the Georgian factor due to Armenia’s integration into the regional communication network. The United States’ initiative policy toward the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement, which was aimed at opening a second access to the regional infrastructure after the Black Sea coast of Georgia evoked a sharp response in Baku and caused Azerbaijan to launch an intensive process of drawing closer to Russia. The unfolding of this scenario will thwart the efforts exerted in the region for many years by the second U.S. representative Anne E. Derse. Matthew Bryza’s principal task as Head of the U.S. diplomatic mission to Azerbaijan will be to prevent Baku from torpedoing Washington’s important initiatives, including the ones that may be launched on the threshold of implementation of a possible agreement on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In this case, it is only external pressure on Baku that can prove effective – the incumbent Azerbaijani President Ilham Alyev, and his father Heydar, successfully did away with the domestic political factor long ago.

Quite different tasks have been set to Marie Yovanovitch, who was recently appointed U.S. Ambassador to Armenia. Her experience in Kyrgyzstan, which resulted in the former Kyrgyz president Askar Akayev going to Moscow, suggests she “majors” in establishing ties and ensuring control over domestic political processes. It is the domestic political aspect of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem that is prevalent in Armenia, with the level of political freedoms here being much higher than in neighboring Azerbaijan. According to some information, Yovanovitch maintains a close dialogue with Armenia’s principal oppositionist, ex-president Levon Ter-Petrosyan. Despite his aggressive rhetoric, he has never pronounced against the unblocking of the Armenian-Turkish border or against the security belt round Nagorno-Karabakh being placed under Azerbaijan’s control. Thus, the Armenian Opposition seems to be critical of the Armenian President for not following a hard line in the negotiations. In fact, however, it is the Opposition alone that is creating conditions on the domestic political scene for the President to be “yielding” on the foreign political scene.

On the other hand, U.S. Ambassador to Georgia John F. Tefft has recently lowered his activity. According to some information, he is soon to be moved to Ukraine – a country with domestic political processes following the logic similar to that in Georgia, with a low probability of large-scale military operations.

The nomination of Tina Kaidanow to the post presently being held by Matthew Bryza proved to be the most interesting appointment in the U.S. Department of State. Bryza’s prospective successor worked in the Balkans and greatly contributed to the recognition of Kosovo’s independence. On July 18, 2008, she was appointed head of the U.S. diplomatic mission to the former Serbian region. Earlier, from July 2006 to July 2008, she was head of the Priština office. While in Kosovo, Tina Kaidanow arrived in Sarajevo to work as deputy head of mission. She was special assistant for European affairs to United States Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who is one of the most influential American diplomats. She was also in charge of South-East Europe Affairs at the United States National Security Council.

The information on Kaidanow’s appointment as coordinator of the U.S. policy in the Black Sea and Caspian regions caused excitement in the Azerbaijani political community. Since Bryza is leaving the post of OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair, Kaidanow may “get down to” the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. Azerbaijan must have examined the results of Kaidanow’s previous activities and fears her experience will be applied in the South Caucasus. On our part, we would like to note that, with her wide experience in dealing with territorial and ethnic conflicts, Tina Kaidanow will make her – hopefully positive – contribution to the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem.

In one of her interviews, answering a question as to what country she would like to continue her career in, Kaidanow said: “There are so many places in the world where there is so much interesting work to be done. Obviously there are a lot of countries where the United States have interest to be. Technically speaking we have to be ready for worldwide service. And I think I am. I haven't been in Asia or in Africa , so I would find it interesting to go there.”