The Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) called on the U.S. Department of State this week to officially investigate the potentially illegal use of U.S. defense equipment in a 2017 Israeli drone attack by the Azerbaijani military against the Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh) Republic.
In a letter to Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Tina Kaidanow, the ANCA requested an open inquiry into “potential U.S. arms export violations in connection with the Israeli government’s legal action against Aeronautics Defense Systems, an arms manufacturer accused of illegally launching a 2017 Orbiter 1K armed drone attack, in coordination with the Azerbaijani military, against Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh).”
The attack reportedly took place in July, 2017, when the firm was demonstrating their Orbiter 1 drone to Azerbaijani military officials, and was asked to live test its capabilities on Artsakh positions. While the drones did not hit their targets, Army Colonel Armen Gyozalian confirmed to Israeli news outlets that two soldiers were lightly wounded in the incident.
The ANCA highlighted the troubling “prospect that Aeronautics Defense Systems armed drones and other defense systems deployed by Azerbaijan against both Artsakh and Armenia may – in contravention of U.S. law and Administration policy – contain U.S. components or technology subject to the U.S. Arms Export Control Act and other legal restrictions governing the third-party sale or transfer of U.S. defense and dual-use articles, technology, or services.” The letter noted a specific area of ANCA concern, notably: “the possible use of transistors, electrical components, and other equipment and technology,” in the Orbiter 1K armed drone.
“Violations of U.S. law in connection to this specific assault and the broader pattern of Azerbaijani aggression against Armenia and Artsakh undermine U.S. interests in promoting regional stability, deterring a renewed outbreak of regional war, and preventing proliferation, including through potential Azerbaijani third-party sale or transfer of sensitive U.S. equipment, software or technology to Russia, Iran, or other problem end-users,” concluded the ANCA.
