Armenian forces are seen as better trained and more capable of sustaining a protracted conflict with Azerbaijan, reads the report on Karabakh issued by London-based the International Institute For Strategic Studies. NEWS.am posts the excerpts from the report available on IISS website.

“Military competition between Armenia and Azerbaijan is intense. Benefiting significantly from rising oil and gas export revenues, Azerbaijan’s 2009 defence budget was around $1.4 billion, more than three times that of Armenia’s $400 million. Azerbaijan, with 67,000 military personnel, has a bigger army than Armenia’s 47,000, though the latter figure does not include Nagorno-Karabakh’s forces, which may number as many as 20,000.

Although Azerbaijan has relied on the United States and Turkey to help it with military modernisation and training, it has also bought some ex-Soviet equipment from Ukraine, including 30 MiG-25 fighter jets and 12 long-range missiles. The reported purchase of S-300 air-defence systems could affect the balance by providing a reliable defence for Azerbaijan’s energy infrastructure, which is seen as the key potential target for Armenia if Azerbaijan sought to retake Nagorno-Karabakh by force.

Armenia has acquired significant amounts of Russian weapons at discount prices available to CSTO members. It also has geography on its side: the ceasefire line is a natural line of defence for Armenian forces who hold the strategic high ground in the mountainous terrain adjoining it, and who have built several lines of fortifications on their side of the line.

 Because of these fortifications and the geographic advantage, Nagorno-Karabakh leaders strongly oppose any return of the occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan, as proposed in the peace plan. Most of the territories are sparsely populated, with the exception of the strategically important Lachin corridor linking Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. However, ceding them would undermine Armenia’s capability to fend off any Azerbaijani attempt to retake Nagorno-Karabakh by force,” the report reads.

The experts also draw attention to Baku’s military rhetoric. “Although many Azerbaijanis understand that their country lacks the military capabilities needed to win, Baku has been using increasingly aggressive rhetoric, vowing not to accept the status quo and to exercise its right to restore its territorial integrity by force. ‘The war is not over,’ Aliyev warned on 10 August.

Such statements reflect the growing concern in Azerbaijan that Armenia is only taking part in peace negotiations to buy time, and does not intend to begin withdrawing forces from occupied territories. Azerbaijan is also concerned that Kosovo’s independence and Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia could set a precedent for Nagorno-Karabakh.  

While Armenian forces seem able to defend themselves, it is not obvious that they would receive Russian military assistance in any renewed conflict with Azerbaijan. Despite Armenia’s CSTO membership and the new agreements signed by Medvedev few in Moscow believe Russia would automatically intervene on the side of Armenia. CSTO guarantees were recently thrown into question when Russia rejected a request from Kyrgyzstan for the organization to send forces to quell violence in its southern region of Osh. And although Medvedev reiterated in August that Armenia was Russia’s ally, his chief foreign-policy aide Sergei Prikhodko later stressed that Russia was not saying it would defend Armenia against Azerbaijan. Russia recognizes the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and might stand back if military operations were not affecting the territory of Armenia proper or the Russian base there.

Against this background, Russia’s military diplomacy may be prompting a change in the strategic calculations on either side. Moscow is keeping them both guessing,” the report says.