Relations between Georgia and the Western world are currently in a grave state. For many years, Tbilisi was perceived as the principal strategic partner of Washington and Brussels. Moreover, Georgia served as an example for many pro-Western experts, analysts, and scholars of how a post-Soviet state could almost completely abandon its Soviet-Russian legacy and fully orient itself toward integration into Western institutions. 

However, today a de facto cold war is unfolding between Tbilisi and Brussels, while the administration of President Donald Trump is carefully observing Georgia, not fully understanding in what format further relations should be constructed. At the same time, one should not forget that the legacy of the administration of Joe Biden, which was extremely negatively disposed toward the government of the “Georgian Dream,” continues to exert a substantial influence on the decisions of the current American president. 

In particular, over all these years the image of the “Georgian Dream” as a force not seeking to participate in geopolitical confrontation with the Russian Federation has not been positively received in the camp of the so-called “hawks.” It is precisely the “hawks” who today occupy key positions in the political establishment of Brussels and, to a considerable extent, in the White House. This is so despite the fact that Donald Trump himself pursues a more conservative policy, and his ideological orientations are in many respects close to the ideology of the “Georgian Dream.” 

Many argue that the “Georgian Dream” is leading the country along an autocratic path. Indeed, a process of tightening the political regime is taking place, and the liberal bacchanalia that existed in Georgia – when anyone could do whatever they wished, register media outlets at any time, and say whatever they pleased on television – has come to an end. That period has concluded. 

The “Georgian Dream” is also criticized for an allegedly pro-Russian policy. However, here a fundamental question arises: why did the ruling party nevertheless succeed in convincing a significant part of the Georgian population that its course is advantageous and correct? If one delves into public sentiment, one can discern the presence of persistent dissatisfaction and resentment toward the Western world. It may be argued that a substantial portion of the Georgian electorate feels offended by the West. At least three factors contribute to this. 

The first factor is connected with the issue of NATO. Since 2005, Georgian society has been consistently persuaded that NATO represents not merely a North Atlantic military bloc, but also a crucial milestone on the path toward integration into the Western world. Through membership in NATO, Georgia was to become part of the Western family and demonstrate its ideological loyalty, based on strategic fidelity to the geopolitical interests of the United States and Europe. In return, a reward in the form of membership in the Alliance was expected. 

Seventeen years have passed since the plebiscite in which Georgian citizens expressed support for integration into NATO. Moreover, in 2017 amendments were introduced into the Constitution of Georgia that закрепили membership in NATO and the EU as priority objectives. Yet already in 2024 any mention of Georgia’s possible future in NATO was removed from annual report. 

As a result, a situation emerged in which Georgian society, in essence, suffered because of its own intentions: the country sent its servicemen to Afghanistan and other conflict zones, did everything possible to earn recognition and reward for its loyalty, yet received neither NATO membership nor even a symbolic mention. The political elite and a significant part of the citizenry felt deceived. 

The second factor is connected with relations with the European Union. In the post-Soviet space, Georgia has traditionally been perceived as one of the most democratic states. The country, striving to be recognized by Brussels, implemented large-scale reforms and adopted numerous institutional changes. However, as soon as disagreements arose between Tbilisi and Brussels, the process of European integration was almost instantly suspended. 

As an example, one may cite judicial reform, within the framework of which proposals were advanced to appoint judges according to highly controversial schemes, including the involvement of foreign judges. One may also recall the demands to lower the electoral threshold in parliamentary elections to 1 percent, which led to the fragmentation of parliament and the emergence of easily manageable political forces. 

Of particular significance was Tbilisi’s refusal to participate in attempts to inflict a strategic defeat on the Russian Federation. As soon as the geopolitical interests of Brussels proved even partially incompatible with Georgia’s national interests, sanctions followed. 

Brussels does not merely finance local civil society, which actively participates in protests and the picketing of government buildings. Part of this civil society also attempted to seize the building of the Georgian parliament on 4 October 2025. At the same time, European leaders effectively severed most political and diplomatic contacts with Tbilisi, awaiting the moment when the current authorities would be replaced, in order subsequently to involve Georgia in the strategic struggle against the Russian Federation. 

This demonstrated to the majority of the country’s population that approval from Brussels is possible only under conditions of unconditional obedience – strategic subordination – and that any attempt to defend one’s own position will be punished. 

The third factor is connected with a comparative analysis of the policies of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. For a significant part of Georgian society, these countries for a long time were not regarded as examples of “civilizational” development. Azerbaijan oriented itself toward the Turkic world, Armenia was in a strategic alliance with Russia and hosted a military base in Gyumri. Moreover, both states remained part of the CIS, which Georgia deliberately left more than a decade ago. At the same time, neither of these countries carried out large-scale reforms comparable to those implemented in Georgia. 

Nevertheless, it is precisely Armenia and Azerbaijan that today are perceived by Brussels as strategic partners. While Georgia fully adapted its foreign and domestic policy to European standards, effectively outsourcing a significant part of its sovereign decision-making, the more pragmatic models of Yerevan and Baku brought them tangible dividends. Consequently, the rapprochement of Brussels with Baku and Yerevan only reinforces the perception that the entirely pragmatic policies of the latter two – without any pro-Western fanaticism or self-sacrifice – have produced results no less positive than the readiness of political elites in Tbilisi to sacrifice everything for the coveted approval of the “civilized” world. For the European Union, Armenia and Azerbaijan today appear geopolitically and geo-strategically more significant than Georgia. 

As a result, a situation has developed in which the “Georgian Dream” rather effectively employs these arguments in its criticism of the European Union. It is becoming increasingly difficult to counter this argumentation with objective facts: NATO membership has not become a reality, negotiations with the EU have effectively been suspended, while Moldova and Ukraine – lagging behind Georgia by all democratic and other indicators – at least nominally, according to the rhetoric of European representatives, are advancing at full speed toward EU membership. 

A significant part of the Georgian population has asked itself a simple but fundamentally important question: was it necessary to enter into open confrontation with the Russian Federation, to seek the removal of Russian military bases from Georgian territory, to send one’s own servicemen to Afghanistan and Iraq, to join all initiatives of the United States and the European Union, to implement painful reforms and changes for many years, only to receive punishment in the form of the political “cancellation” of Georgia merely because the “Georgian Dream” decided not to interfere in the confrontation between Russia and the Western world. 

For a significant part of Georgian society, the answer appears unambiguous: no, it was not worth it. 

Archil Sikharulidze 

SIKHA foundation, Tbilisi