When the G7 leaders met in the Bavarian Alps in June, they pledged to support Ukraine in the long term. Their peers in the G20 are less supportive, Bloomberg reported.
The G-20, which includes countries that account for about 85% of global economic output, is supposed to better reflect the world. However, only half of the G-20 countries joined the international sanctions against the Russian Federation.
Senior officials from a small group of wealthy countries traveled the world to justify a tighter economic network around Russia. They were surprised by the lack of agreement from the G-20 states.
This is the uncomfortable reality that Secretary of State Antony Blinken faces during his extended tour of Southeast Asia and Africa: much of the world is unprepared to follow US and European efforts to isolate Russia.
This makes agreement on global initiatives, such as the G7 cap on Russian oil prices, even more of a challenge.
China's spending on Russian oil has skyrocketed since the start of the war, spending 72% more on Russian energy purchases in June than a year earlier.
In any case, China is in a state of rivalry with the US: tensions escalated this week over House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taipei, as well as a G-7 statement expressing concern about Beijing's threatening actions around Taiwan.
Beijing has canceled a personal meeting scheduled for this week in Cambodia between the foreign ministers of China and Japan, which is part of the G-7. Japan said late Thursday that several ballistic missiles launched by China during an exercise near Taiwan had landed in its exclusive economic zone - the first time this had happened - and issued a diplomatic protest.
But Beijing is far from alone in rejecting calls to rein in the Kremlin. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke on the phone with Putin on July 1 and discussed ways to increase trade. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, leader in Brazil's presidential race, has blamed the war not only on Russia but also on Ukraine.
In South Africa, President Cyril Ramaphosa has criticized US-imposed sanctions. Turkey concluded that punishing Russia would harm Ankara's economic and political interests.
Economic imperatives are one reason for the restraint of what is often called the Global South. But there are others, including historical proximity to Moscow, fears of signs of a US disengagement, and distrust of former colonial powers that fuels a sense of hypocrisy.
There are parallels with China and US efforts to build a coalition of democracies against Beijing. US Undersecretary of Commerce Alan Estevez said in July that Washington's cooperation with 37 countries to impose export controls on Russia provided the blueprint for a new system to counter threats from China.
Here too, the US and like-minded countries can point to only limited success as G-20 members, including this year's host Indonesia, continue to sign big deals with Chinese state-owned companies while the trade balance remains in Beijing's favor.
Take Saudi Arabia, which maintains good relations with Moscow through its participation in the OPEC+ oil cartel. He is also friendly with Beijing: Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman recently said that many Chinese companies are already doing business in Neom, its flagship mega project.
Riyadh doesn't have to choose between American and Chinese technology, "just like you can have McDonald's and Burger King on the same street," Saudi Ambassador to the United States Princess Reema bint Bandar told reporters during a visit by President Joe Biden in July .
This selective approach to foreign policy has created competition for influence. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz defiantly invited Argentina, Indonesia, India and South Africa, none of which have imposed sanctions on Russia, to his G-7 summit on Ukraine in late June.
Last month, the struggle for soft power was on display in Africa when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov received praise for Moscow's nuclear power technology. He took the opportunity to highlight Russia's historic support for African liberation movements, while stating that sanctions were the cause of food insecurity.
French President Emmanuel Macron, during his tour of Africa, condemned Russia for waging a "new kind of hybrid world war" on the continent.
China had a similar game in Africa. The African country, alternately with China, hosts the China-Africa Cooperation Forum every three years, which is traditionally visited by the President of the People's Republic of China and meets one-on-one with almost every head of state. When FOCAC is held in Beijing, the red carpet rolls out and tiny Equatorial New Guinea gets as much attention as Nigeria, a level of attention not seen in Washington.
China knows that every African state has one vote in the United Nations and its institutions, and this pays off diplomatically. Earlier this year, the US sent a letter to the Human Rights Council condemning China for alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang, signed by 47 people, mostly European allies. Cuba responded with a statement on behalf of China, supported by 62 countries, mostly in the Global South.
Blinken's decision to travel on August 7 from Asia to South Africa and then to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda looks like an attempt to rebuild a narrative not only against China but also against Russia.
Biden said he would welcome African leaders to Washington in December for a summit that will build on our common values to better promote new economic engagement. In addition to addressing issues of pandemic preparedness, climate change and food security, Biden said the meeting will strengthen the US and Africa's commitment to democracy and human rights.
However, according to Maria Repnikova, an assistant professor of global communications at Georgia State University, China's pragmatic use of soft power—focused on education and jobs, while showing off its technological advances and progress against poverty—often resonates more at the Global South than the US with their values.
Meanwhile, Moscow is using various ways of appealing and standing up for and with the Global South as their champion, Repnikova, author of China’s Soft Power, said in an interview. It's less than China's reach, she said, but they're working hard on their narrative competition through social media and diplomatic language.
According to Repnikova, this approach is applicable not only to Africa, but also to Asia and Latin America, where Russia has supplied countries with its Covid-19 vaccine, and China is investing heavily.
South American trade bloc Mercosur has turned down President Volodymyr Zelenskiy's request to speak at a summit in late July.
In Indonesia, President Joko Widodo maintained traditional non-alignment despite pressure to exclude Putin from November's G-20 summit. He invited both Russian and Ukrainian presidents to Bali.
According to Repnikova, recent events show that the competition for influence is becoming more entrenched. This leaves little chance for states to mobilize to change their position - unless something very important is proposed.
