The outcome of the elections to be held in Turkey will shape geopolitical and economic calculations in Washington and Moscow, as well as in capitals across Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa, Bloomberg reported.
Ankara’s influence in world affairs attests to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s achievements over his long stint at the helm. Even so, at home and abroad, his electoral prospects evoke mixed feelings. And those who wish him gone on June 19 cannot be sanguine about who, or what, will come next.
Western leaders will be glad to see the back of Erdogan. He has undermined NATO’s security by acquiring missile-defense systems from Russia, frustrated the alliance by blocking the membership of Sweden and Finland, repeatedly threatened to flood Europe with refugees and, in recent months, hurled increasingly bellicose rhetoric toward Greece. Ankara’s relations with Washington have grown strained to the point where top Turkish officials routinely accuse the US of backing a coup against Erdogan and of complicity with terrorist groups.
The US and Europe would be better off without Erdogan’s disruptive influence in world affairs, especially as their confrontation with Vladimir Putin intensifies. His utility as an interlocutor is limited: Although he helped to broker an agreement to ensure continued flows of grain and vegetable oil from Ukraine last summer, Erdogan has had no restraining influence on his “dear friend” Vladimir.
Although many in the foreign-policy circles of Washington and European capitals cling to the hope that he can be lured back in from the cold, Erdogan’s worldview is “far more radical than most Westerners think,” says political analyst Selim Koru.
Should Erdogan be defeated, says Sinan Ulgen, director of the Istanbul think tank EDAM, “his successor will transform Turkey into a different foreign policy actor, more comfortable with its position as a Western nation.”
But even if that happens, nobody should expect a quick 180-degree turn. Erdogan has had 20 years to seed Turkish institutions—the government, the military, academia, the religious establishment and the media—with his radical worldview. If there is a new president on June 19, they will need to dismantle the edifice Erdogan has built. The task will be harder still because his AK Party will remain a substantial presence in parliament, one sure to resist change furiously.
It’s worth remembering that it took Erdogan the best part of a decade to undermine the secular deep state built by Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey—and the AK Party had comfortable majorities in parliament throughout that period. A Hercules might balk at having to clean the Anatolian stables after his departure.
Turks are of two minds about their president and his policies. A late October survey by Metropoll showed approval for Erdogan was up to 47.6%, from about 39% a year ago. This would be remarkable for any leader who has been around as long as he has—in democracies, anti-incumbent sentiment tends to grows with time—but it is downright astonishing for one who is presiding over an economic mess.
Why, then, do many still look to Erdogan to correct Turkey’s course? In part, it’s because they don’t know who will challenge his hold on the reins. The main opposition parties have formed a united front known as the Table of Six, but less than six months to election day, they have not yet announced their presidential candidate. The two leading contenders are from the leading opposition party, CHP: Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu and the longtime party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu.
The Table of Six has also been slow to articulate a clear strategy to mend Turkey’s economy. Early last month the CHP finally unveiled something resembling an agenda, but it was long on airy promises of big investments and short on detail. (The most notable thing about the event was the presence of Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist Daron Acemoglu. The Good Party, another of the Table of Six, counts Wharton professor of private equity Bilge Yilmaz among its leaders.)
Erdogan’s preferred opponent would be Kilicdaroglu, a somewhat colorless veteran who has led the CHP for 12 years. Many Turkish political analysts say the younger, more charismatic Imamoglu would be the stronger challenger. He won the Istanbul mayorship in 2019 by running an inclusive, upbeat campaign, even after a rerun forced by Erdogan’s refusal to accept the results for the first vote.
The president and his party have expended great energy to keep Imamoglu at bay. Last month, the mayor was convicted on the trifling charge of insulting election officials, but the verdict united the opposition behind him and may have boosted his chances of becoming the presidential candidate. “There is now a strong narrative around Imamoglu,” says Ayse Zarakol, professor of international relations at the University of Cambridge. “The momentum is with him.” (The election rules allow the mayor to run for president while his lawyers challenge the conviction.)
But Erdogan’s still-strong numbers suggest he could hold off any challenger, especially if the economy shows signs of recovery in the spring. The president is counting on investments and bank deposits from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, and on Putin’s promises of making Turkey a hub for Russian natural gas exports, to lift the gloom. Erdogan has also been talking up Turkey’s own natural gas finds in the Black Sea, encouraging speculation of a revenue windfall. Last month, he announced increases in the minimum wage of 55%; last week, he boosted the salaries and pensions of civil servants.
For good measure, he and his party have been invoking the old bogeymen of Kurdish terrorism and Western perfidy, as well as culture-war tropes about the dangers of homosexuality to family and Islamic values. The threats to Greece are directed at cranking up nationalistic fervor.
These tactics have helped Erdogan win elections before. They might again. Until the Turks cast their votes, Western leaders will remain on tenterhooks, Bloomberg concluded.
