The distinctive features of any football match are — besides the rival teams — three referees, fans, coaches and even match inspectors. It is the excitement over the score that largely accounts for a game being a thrilling one or not: it may end in a draw or one of the teams may come off winner. Football pundits normally predict the results of games on the basis of teams’ ratings, strong and weak points. However, football can often spring a surprise: the weaker team may show will to win and beat its opponent. The fans’ support, coach’s competent strategy and, sometimes, the referees’ bias may be of help. This can be said about football as a sport.

But there appears to exist political football as well. With the rules of the game being not so clear, the game itself is no less thrilling and surprising.

This October we can see the second half of the match between the Armenian and Turkish teams. The first half ended in a draw, but the general atmosphere and efforts exerted by the sides, the mood of spectators and referees allow some predictions about the results to be made.

The match was called a historic one. The rival teams had not met for almost 100 years. The period had been sufficient for the supporters to develop deep distrust toward each other. The American aficionados of political football supposedly arranged the match. They are on special terms with the Turkish team and have special commitments to Armenian supporters. The most important thing is, however, their keen interest in the regional standings, which have recently undergone serious changes. Specifically, after suffering a crushing defeat at the hands of the Russian team, the Georgian team yielded its standings to the Azerbaijani and Armenian teams thereby stepping up competition between them. The Russian team’s being undisputed leader of the regional group is not quite to the liking of the other teams, particularly the Turkish and American ones, the more so because the Armenian team’s stronger positions only contribute to this leadership.

Now let us digress a little here and take a pragmatic view of the process.

It is obvious now that even a faint possibility of Armenian-Turkish rapprochement has caused metamorphosis in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process – despite western diplomats’ assurances that these are two different, but simultaneous, processes. The Baku circles do not believe them – and right they are! A dialogue with Armenia and Turkey has never been part of Ilham Aliyev’s plans as it deprives him of his number one trump card, namely, demagogic statements on Armenia’s isolation. So the Azerbaijani President’s strategy launched after Yerevan and Ankara agreed on the road map had nothing in common with the unpublished principle of fair play in effect in football.

To vex Turkey, Aliyev made a step toward even closer relations with Moscow though during his presidency he has not made a single step in Russia’s political interests. Azerbaijan continues a GUAM member, preparing to join NATO, rendering further assistance to the Nabucco project and promoting the idea of laying a Transcaspian gas main. Azerbaijan continues supplying mercenaries to the North Caucasus and energy carriers to Georgia.

What could be of interest to Moscow? Why did Russia lay aside its real politico-military interests, the issue of the CSTO’s future, its strategic relations with Armenia, while it is developing a dialogue with Baku? Why has Sergey Naryshkin, as Head of the RF Presidential Administration, made two trips abroad and both of them to Baku? What does the Russian Minister of Defense discuss with his Azerbaijani counterpart in Baku? Why does he listen to Abiyev’s threats against Russia’s strategic partner?

The point is that, despite showing its interest in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Moscow does not actually have a clear idea of its policy in case of any changes in the alignment of forces. So Baku’s policy of torpedoing any positive trends in the region meets Russia’s interests fine. But Moscow cannot be unaware of Azerbaijan’s ultimate aim. It is an 'open secret'. The ultimate aim of Baku’s strategy is like a faithful copy of Turkey’s strategy: ousting Russia from the Caucasus and simultaneously neutralizing the Armenian factor.

Russia is playing the same game. So why is it surprised that its positions in the post-Soviet area are getting weaker and weaker from year to year? It is not even football. Rather, it is a giveaway game. Being unable to support a partner at the right moment, colluding with its opponent and failing to understand the rules of the game is a straight way to coming off a loser.